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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
 
1. OVERVIEW – This paper discusses abusive pricing practices by 
dominant undertakings. It starts with an overview of the different ways an 
undertaking can abuse its dominant position through pricing (chapter 2). The 
focus of this work is on margin squeeze. We start by defining margin squeeze 
(chapter 3), and then look at how margin squeeze is assessed (chapter 4 and 5). It 
will be examined why some undertakings appear to be more susceptible to this 
abuse than others (chapter 6). The last part of this paper investigates the place of 
margin squeeze in the European legislative framework. It first considers which 
kind of competition law abuse margin squeeze could be and currently is (chapter 
7), and then focuses on the interaction of this competition law approach with the 
regulatory approach (chapter 8). 
1.2. RELEVANCE 
2. JURISPRUDENTIAL AND DOCTRINAL INTEREST – Margin squeeze only 
entered the European competition scene slowly. For the last decade, however, it 
has been the subject of intense enforcement by the Commission. Cases often 
make their way up the European courts. National competition and regulatory 
authorities have also actively pursued margin squeeze cases. This may be 
explained by the recent liberalisation of certain sectors, often under EU direction. 
Margin squeeze is closely connected to this greater European project, and spans 
both competition law and regulation. All of this may help to explain why 
doctrinal interest in margin squeeze has soared recently. However, the field is 
certainly not occupied. It leaves plenty of space for this contribution. 
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1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS – The following questions require a specific 
answer: 
1. How do the European courts assess whether there is a margin squeeze 
abuse? (chapter 4 and 5) 
2. Where does margin squeeze fit in the European legislative framework? 
This question consists of two sub-questions: 
a. Theoretically, where could margin squeeze fit in the 
competition law framework, and how do the European courts 
currently conceive margin squeeze? (chapter 7) 
b. How does the competition law approach interact with the 
regulatory approach? (chapter 8) 
 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4. FIRST QUESTION – The answer to the first research question is 
evidently found in the case law of the European courts. Commission decisions 
are also of value, as they are the starting point of the European courts’ judgments. 
To get the full picture, it is useful to work through the judgments chronologically. 
The doctrine may provide rationalisation, critique and alternatives. 
5. SECOND QUESTION – To answer the second research question, the 
doctrine is the starting point. Certain authors construe the margin squeeze 
differently than the European courts. Their findings will be analysed and 
grouped along the alternatives they present, and shortfalls will be identified. The 
case law of the European courts provides us with a clear answer. For the 
interaction between the competition and the regulatory approach, we return to 
the case law of the European courts. Again, the doctrine may provide guidance. 
 
6. COMPARATIVE APPROACH – The answers to these questions will 
benefit from a comparison with the approach to margin squeeze in the United 
States. We will look at the jurisprudence of the highest court in the US, more 
specifically the linkLine case. In this judgment, the US Supreme Court clearly set 
out its position on margin squeeze claims. It handles the antitrust abuse and its 
interaction with sector-specific regulation very differently than the ECJ. 
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2. ABUSIVE PRINCING PRACTICES 
 
7. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK – Abusive pricing practices are combatted 
under Art. 102 TFEU, which reads as follows: 
 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in 
so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist 
in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
Art. 102 TFEU prohibits undertakings to abuse their dominant position. The 
provision targets unfair purchase or selling prices in various ways. However, the 
list is not exhaustive; other abuses are possible.1 
 
8. POLICY FRAMEWORK – Recital 23 of the Guidance Paper establishes 
the following framework for price setting by undertakings: 
 
“Vigorous price competition is generally beneficial to consumers. With a view to preventing 
anti-competitive foreclosure, the Commission will normally only intervene where the conduct 
concerned has already been or is capable of hampering competition from competitors which 
are considered to be as efficient as the dominant undertaking.”2 
 
The Commission shall thus only intervene when price competition actually 
becomes anti-competitive. 
 
2.1. EXCESSIVE PRICING 
 
9. CHARGING EXCESSIVELY HIGH SELLING PRICES – Art. 102, a) TFEU 
prohibits “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions”. In the landmark case of United Brands, the ECJ 
considered a price excessive when “it has no reasonable relation to the economic 
                                                 
1 ECJ 21 February 1973, case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, Europemballage Corporation and Continental 
Can Company Inc., ECR 1973, 215, para. 26; ECJ 14 November 1996, case C-333/94 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:436, Tetra Pak II, ECR I-5951, para. 37. 
2 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 23 with 
reference to ECJ 3 July 1991, case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, AKZO Chemie, ECR 1991, I-
3359, para. 72 and CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 
2008, II-477, para. 172. 
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value of the product supplied.”3 This excess can be determined objectively “by 
making a comparison between the selling price of the product in question and 
its cost of production, which would disclose the amount of the profit margin.”4 
The next question is whether the imposed price is unfair in itself, or when 
compared to competing products.5 
 
10. EXTRACTING EXCESSIVELY LOW PURCHASE PRICES – Art. 102, a) 
TFEU also explicitly prohibits imposing unfair purchase prices. This targets the 
situation where a dominant undertaking, contracting as a buyer, forces a seller 
to charge excessively low prices. For an undertaking to be able to do this, it must 
have buyer power.6  Supermarkets are the usual suspects when it comes to this 
abuse.7 
 
2.3. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
 
11. ABUSE – Art. 102, c) TFEU prohibits “applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage”. This Article gives courts the clear guideline to 
establish (i) the equivalence of the transactions; (ii) the dissimilarity of the 
conditions; and (iii) the competitive disadvantage. An undertaking cannot only 
discriminate by conducting a regular pricing policy; granting rebates or bonuses 
are common forms of price discrimination.8 Landmark cases in this area are 
Hoffman-La Roche9, Irish Sugar10 and British Airways11. 
 
2.4. REBATE SCHEMES 
 
12. CLASSIFICATION – Rebates come in many forms. Consequently, they 
have been classified in many ways. The following classification is the one that 
runs through the European Commission’s documents 12 , i.e. a distinction 
between conditional and bundled rebates. 
                                                 
3 ECJ 14 February 1978, case 27/67, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, United Brands, ECR 1978, 207, para. 250. 
4 ECJ 14 February 1978, case 27/67, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, United Brands, ECR 1978, 207, para. 251. 
5 ECJ 14 February 1978, case 27/67, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, United Brands, ECR 1978, 207, para. 
252; P. AKMAN and L. GARROD, “When are excessive prices unfair?” in Journal of Competition Law 
& Economics 2011, 403-426. 
6 On that topic, see European Commission, Note to the OECD Roundtable on Monopsony and 
Buyer Power, DAF/COMP/WD (2008) 80. 
7 The Declaration of the European Parliament on investigating and remedying abuse of power by 
large supermarkets operating in the European Union of 19 February 2008 may serve as an 
illustration. 
8 Infra title 2.4 “Rebate schemes”. 
9 ECJ 13 February 1979, case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, Hoffmann-La Roche, ECR 1979, 461. 
10 ECJ 10 July 2001, case C-497/99 P, ECLI:EU:C:2001:393, Irish Sugar, ECR 2001, I-5333. 
11 ECJ 15 March 2007, case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166, British Airways, ECR 2007, I-2377. 
12 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005; Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20. 
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13. 1) CONDITIONAL REBATES – Conditional rebates are rebates that “are 
granted to customers to reward a certain (purchasing) behaviour of these 
customers in a particular period of time.” 13  These rebates may infringe 
competition law because they (i) restrict the purchaser in his possible choices of 
sources of supply and deny other producers access to the market; and (ii) result 
in the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
different trading parties (price discrimination, Art. 102, c) TFEU).14  
 
Conditional rebates usually come in the form of target rebates.15 A target rebate 
means that the customer is given a rebate if its purchases over a defined reference 
period exceed a certain threshold.16 The rebate can then either be granted on 
all purchases (retroactive rebates) or only on those purchases that exceed the 
required threshold (incremental rebates).17 On top of those mentioned earlier,18 
the cases Michelin I and Michelin II are relevant, certainly with regard to the 
reference period.19 
 
14. 2) MULTI-PRODUCT REBATES – Multi-product rebates are a particular 
kind of rebates. This abuse consists in conditioning a rebate on cumulated 
purchases in separate product markets. According to the Commission, “[a] 
multi-product rebate may be anti-competitive on the tied or the tying market if 
it is so large that equally efficient competitors offering only some of the 
components cannot compete against the discounted bundle” (tying, Art. 102, d) 
TFEU).20 Leading cases on these rebates include Hoffman-La Roche21 and Hilti 22. 
                                                 
13 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005, para. 151; Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 
24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 37 contains an almost identical definition. 
14 ECJ 13 February 1979, case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, Hoffmann-La Roche, ECR 1979, 461, 
para. 90. 
15 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005, para. 151; Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 
24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 37. 
16 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005, para. 151; Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 
24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 37. 
17 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005, paras 152-165 and paras 166-169, respectively; Guidance on the Commission's 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 37. 
18 Supra nr. 11 “ABUSE”. 
19 ECJ 9 November 1983, case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313, Michelin I, ECR 1983, 3461; CFI 20 
September 2003, case T-203/01, ECLI:EU:T:2003:250, Michelin II, ECR 2003, II-4071. 
20 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 60; see 
also DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005, paras 193-194. 
21 ECJ 13 February 1979, case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, Hoffmann-La Roche, ECR 1979, 461. 
22 CFI 12 December 1991, case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70, Hilti, ECR 1991, II-1439. 
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15. JUSTIFICATION – According to consistent case law, “only discounts or 
bonuses which are not based on any economic counterpart to justify them must 
be regarded as an abuse.” 23  The Commission labels this ‘the efficiency 
defence’.24 A prime example is when the rebate scheme leads to cost or other 
advantages that are passed on to the customer.25 But a rebate may also be 
justified because it is indispensable to provide the incentive for the dominant 
supplier to make certain relationship-specific investments in order to be able to 
supply a particular customer.26 
 
2.5. PREDATORY PRICING 
 
16. DEFINITION – In its 16th Report on Competition Policy, the 
Commission defines predatory pricing as “fixing artificially low prices so that a 
competitor is either eliminated or disciplined.” 27  An undertaking usually 
compensates those losses with profits in one or more different markets. 
 
17. AKZO CHEMIE: CRITERIA – In the leading case in this area, the 
undertaking AKZO Chemie tried to drive a small competitor (ECS) out of the 
flour-additives market. 28  ECS wanted to expand into the organic peroxides 
market, another market in which AKZO was dominant. AKZO first threatened 
ECS, and then executed that threat by adopting a long-term policy of 
uneconomic prices. The ECJ deemed this abuse particularly serious “since the 
behaviour complained of was intended to prevent a competitor from extending 
its activity into a market in which AKZO held a dominant position.”29 
 
The ECJ formulated two criteria to assess whether pricing practices are abusive: 
1. “Prices below average variable costs (that is to say, those which vary 
depending on the quantities produced) by means of which a dominant 
                                                 
23 ECJ 15 March 2007, case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166, British Airways, ECR 2007, I-2377, 
para. 84, with reference to ECJ 13 February 1979, case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, Hoffmann-La 
Roche, ECR 1979, 461, para. 90 and ECJ 9 November 1983, case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313, 
Michelin I, ECR 1983, 3461, para. 73. 
24 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005, para. 172; Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 
24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 46. 
25 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005, para. 173; Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 
24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 46; D. VANDERMEERSCH, De Mededingingswet, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2007, 233. 
26 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005, para. 175. 
27 EC, 16th Report on Competition Policy, 1987, para. 334. 
28 ECJ 3 July 1991, case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, AKZO Chemie, ECR 1991, I-3359. 
29 ECJ 3 July 1991, case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, AKZO Chemie, ECR 1991, I-3359, para. 
162. 
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undertaking seeks to eliminate a competitor must be regarded as 
abusive.”30 
2. “Moreover, prices below average total costs (that is to say, fixed costs 
plus variable costs), but above average variable costs, must be regarded 
as abusive if they are determined as part of a plan for eliminating a 
competitor.”31 
 
 
3. MARGIN SQUEEZE DEFINITION 
 
18. DEFINITION – In its Guidance Paper, the Commission defines a margin 
squeeze as the situation where a dominant undertaking charges “a price for the 
product on the upstream market which, compared to the price it charges on the 
downstream market, does not allow even an equally efficient competitor to trade 
profitably in the downstream market on a lasting basis.”32 This definition is 
based on consistent jurisprudence.33 
 
19. FIGURE 1 – Let us start from this simple figure: 
 
 
Undertaking A produces a product (or renders a service). 
 Undertaking A provides its product to undertaking B on the upstream 
market. Undertaking B then sells the product to end-users (blue). 
                                                 
30 ECJ 3 July 1991, case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, AKZO Chemie, ECR 1991, I-3359, para. 
71. 
31 ECJ 3 July 1991, case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, AKZO Chemie, ECR 1991, I-3359, para. 
72. 
32 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 80. 
33 Infra title 4. “Margin squeeze assessment”. 
FRISO BOSTOEN 
10  Jura Falconis Jg. 53, 2016 - 2017, nr. 1 
 Undertaking A also sells its product to end-users on the downstream 
market. It does this directly, or through its subsidiary undertaking a 
(red). 
 
20. FIGURE 2 – Now take a look at the following figure34: 
 
 
 
Undertaking B pays undertaking A wholesale charges, and then makes a profit 
by selling the product to end-users.35 However, undertaking A can ‘squeeze’ 
undertaking B’s retail margin by 
 increasing its wholesale charges (purple); or 
 lowering its retail price, forcing competitors to do the same (beige). 
The next two chapters focus on when this practice constitutes an abuse. 
 
21. EXAMPLES – Margin squeezes are found in a variety of sectors. In Napier 
Brown – British Sugar, for example, the product was sugar.36 British Sugar charged 
its competitors a high price on the upstream market (wholesale sugar), leaving 
its competitors a margin that was too small to compete on the downstream 
market (retail sugar). More recently, most cases originate in the telecom industry. 
Often, one provider owns the network. As a consequence of the European 
liberalisation of the telecom industry, this provider is obliged to grant 
competitors access to its network for a fee (upstream market). If this fee is too 
high, or the retail price too low, those competitors cannot compete in providing 
end-users with services (downstream market). 
 
 
  
                                                 
34 Oxera Agenda 2009, “No margin for error: the challenges of assessing margin squeeze in practice”, 
1. 
35 Of course, the profit of undertaking B will not be equal to the price it charges the end-users minus 
the wholesale charges; just like undertaking A, undertaking B has to factor in a variety of costs to 
actually provide the product to end-users. 
36 EC 18 July 1988, case IV/30.178, Napier Brown – British Sugar, OJ L 284, 19.10.1988, 41 
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4. MARGIN SQUEEZE ASSESSMENT 
 
4.1. COMMISSION DOCUMENTS 
 
22. AS-EFFICIENT-COMPETITOR TEST – The Commission indicates that a 
margin squeeze can be demonstrated “by showing that the dominant company’s 
own downstream operations could not trade profitably on the basis of the 
upstream price charged to its competitors by the upstream operating arm of the 
dominant company.”37 This is the ‘as-efficient-competitor test’.38  
 
23. REASONABLY-EFFICIENT-COMPETITOR TEST – The Commission also 
formulates a second test: “a price squeeze could also be demonstrated by 
showing that the margin between the price charged to competitors on the 
downstream market (including the dominant company’s own downstream 
operations, if any) for access and the price which the network operator charges 
in the downstream market is insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient service 
provider in the downstream market to obtain a normal profit (unless the 
dominant company can show that its downstream operation is exceptionally 
efficient).”39 This is the (now presumably abandoned) 40 ‘reasonably-efficient-
competitor test’.  Let us take a look at the evolution of these tests.  
 
4.2. NATIONAL CARBONISING 
 
24. MARGIN SQUEEZE CONCEPT – The Commission first identified a 
margin squeeze in the National Carbonising case (an application for interim 
measures in the coal industry).41  
 
“The Commission accepts that an undertaking which is in a dominant position as regards 
the production of a raw material (in this case coking coal) and therefore able to control its 
supply to manufacturers of derivatives (in this case, coke) and which is itself manufacturing 
the derivatives in competition with its own customers, may abuse its dominant position if it 
                                                 
37  Commission Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, OJ C 265, 22.08.1998, 2-28, para. 117; DG Competition discussion 
paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, 2005, para. 220. 
38 We also find this criterion in the margin squeeze definition in Guidance on the Commission's 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 80. 
39  Commission Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, OJ C 265, 22.08.1998, 2-28, para. 118. Note that while these tests are 
formulated in the framework of the telecommunications sector, they are generally applicable, see 
para. 6: “As this Notice is based on the generally applicable competition rules, the principles set out 
in this Notice will, to extent that comparable problems arise, be equally applicable in other areas.” 
40  The ECJ, or rather its president, has only withheld the Commission’s reasonably-efficient-
competitor test in the first margin squeeze case, see President of the ECJ 22 October 1975, case 
109/75 R, ECLI:EU:C:1975:133, National Carbonising, ECR 1975, 1193 (infra title 4.2 “National 
Carbonising”). 
41 President of the ECJ 22 October 1975, case 109/75 R, ECLI:EU:C:1975:133, National Carbonising, 
ECR 1975, 1193. 
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acts in such a way as to eliminate the competition from its customers in the market for the 
derivatives.”42 
 
The Commission describes the concept of a margin squeeze in clear wording 
(even though it does not use the term yet) and assesses margin squeeze as an 
abuse of dominant position. 
 
25. REASONABLY-EFFICIENT-COMPETITOR TEST – The Commission then 
formulates the relevant test: 
 
“The Commission accepts that in such a situation the enterprise in a dominant position 
may have an obligation to arrange its prices so as to allow a reasonably efficient 
[downstream competitor] a margin sufficient to enable it to survive in the long term.”43 
 
The test described here is the reasonably-efficient-competitor test. However, it 
is combined with the rather vague criterion of a margin sufficient for long-term 
survival. 
 
4.3. NAPIER BROWN – BRITISH SUGAR  
 
26. AS-EFFICIENT-COMPETITOR TEST – Thirteen years later, in Napier 
Brown, the Commission used a different test. 44  It exchanged the reasonably 
efficient competitor for the as efficient competitor.  
“The pricing information indicated above shows that BS has engaged in a price cutting 
campaign leaving an insufficient margin for a packager and seller of retail sugar, as efficient 
as BS itself in its packaging and selling operations, to survive in the long term.”45 
 
The Commission no longer evaluates the long-term survival of a reasonably 
efficient competitor. Instead, it establishes an objective measure of costs: the as-
efficient-competitor test. However, those costs are again assessed by a vague 
standard: the sufficiency of the margin for long-term survival. 46  Still, 
undertakings can now evaluate with more certainty whether they are abusing 
their dominant position. 
 
  
                                                 
42 President of the ECJ 22 October 1975, case 109/75 R, ECLI:EU:C:1975:133, National Carbonising, 
ECR 1975, 1197. 
43 President of the ECJ 22 October 1975, case 109/75 R, ECLI:EU:C:1975:133, National Carbonising, 
ECR 1975, 1197. 
44 EC 18 July 1988, case IV/30.178, Napier Brown – British Sugar, OJ L 284, 19.10.1988, 41. 
45 EC 18 July 1988, case IV/30.178, Napier Brown – British Sugar, OJ L 284, 19.10.1988, 41, para. 65. 
46 N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: theory, practice, policy – part I” in European Competition Law Review 
2012, 5. 
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4.4. INDUSTRIES DES POUDRES SPHÉRIQUES (IPS) 
 
27. PATCHWORK QUILT APPROACH – Only 25 years after the Commission 
encountered margin squeeze, the Court of First Instance (currently General 
Court; hereafter CFI) decided on a margin squeeze in the IPS case.47 The Court 
held that an undertaking abuses its dominant position when it “sets the price at 
which it sells the unprocessed product at such a level that those who purchase it 
do not have a sufficient profit margin on the processing to remain competitive 
on the market for the processed product.”48 Referring to “those who purchase 
it” (downstream competitors) and the sufficiency of the margin, the Court seems 
to follow the Commission in National Carbonising. But formally, this standard is 
even less rigorous than the reasonably-efficient-competitor test, as “those who 
purchase it” may include inefficient competitors as well. However, the Court 
then applied this test restrictively. It concluded that the pricing policy could not 
be characterised as abusive “[i]n the absence of abusive prices being charged 
[…] for the raw material, […] or of predatory pricing for the derived product.”49 
This way, margin squeeze is not an independent abuse, but rather a patchwork 
of other abusive pricing practices. 
 
4.5. DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AND TELIASONERA 
 
28. RATIONALISED MARGIN SQUEEZE THEORY – In the cases Deutsche 
Telekom 50  and TeliaSonera 51  the Commission and the European courts 
rationalised the margin squeeze theory. The following excerpt from the Deutsche 
Telekom judgment established three important principles. The ECJ subsequently 
confirmed each principle in the TeliaSonera judgment. 
 
“[A] margin squeeze is capable, in itself, of constituting an abuse within the meaning of 
Article [102 TFEU] in view of the exclusionary effect that it can create for competitors 
who are at least as efficient as the appellant. The General Court was not, therefore, obliged 
to establish, additionally, that the wholesale prices for local loop access services or retail 
prices for end-user access services were in themselves abusive on account of their excessive or 
predatory nature, as the case may be.”52 
 
                                                 
47 CFI 30 November 2000, case T-5/97, ECLI:EU:T:2000:278, Industries des Poudres Sphériques (IPS), 
ECR 2000, II-3755. 
48 CFI 30 November 2000, case T-5/97, ECLI:EU:T:2000:278, Industries des Poudres Sphériques (IPS), 
ECR 2000, II-3755, para. 178. 
49 CFI 30 November 2000, case T-5/97, ECLI:EU:T:2000:278, Industries des Poudres Sphériques (IPS), 
ECR 2000, II-3755, para. 179. 
50  EC 21 May 2003, case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263, 
14.10.2003, 9; CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 
2008, II-477; ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 
2010, I-9555. 
51 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527. 
52 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 183. 
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29. STAND-ALONE ABUSE – First of all, the ECJ determines that, according 
to European law, margin squeeze constitutes a stand-alone abuse (“in itself”).53 
It rejects the thesis by the CFI in IPS that the prices charged on the wholesale or 
retail market should in themselves be abusive or predatory.  
 
30. AS-EFFICIENT-COMPETITIOR TEST 2.0 – Secondly, the ECJ confirms 
the Napier Brown ruling of the Commission by affirming the as-efficient-
competitor test as the relevant test to assess margin squeeze.54 However, it drops 
the sufficiency of the margin for long-term survival as a relevant criterion. 
 
31. ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECT – Thirdly, the Court establishes that an 
anti-competitive effect must be demonstrated. 55  It elaborates on this 
requirement in TeliaSonera: 
1. If the margin is negative, an effect that is at least potentially 
exclusionary is probable. The margin is negative when the wholesale 
price the undertaking charges its competitors is higher than the retail 
price it charges end-users. In such a situation, as-efficient-competitors 
would be compelled to sell at a loss.56  
2. If the margin remains positive, it must be demonstrated that the 
application of that pricing practice was (by reason, for example, of 
reduced profitability) likely to have the consequence that it would be at 
least more difficult for the operators concerned to trade on the market 
concerned.57  
 
The second criterion means there may be a margin squeeze infringement even 
where (as efficient) competitors maintain the ability to competitively sell their 
products at prices above costs.58 Authors have criticised this ‘positive margin 
squeeze theory’.59 Some argue that this theory has been overruled in the case of 
                                                 
53 Confirmed in ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, 
I-527, para. 31. 
54 The ECJ elaborates on the specifics of this test in ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-9555, paras 196-202, and reaffirms them in 
ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, paras 
31-33. 
55 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 252, confirmed in ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, 
TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 64. 
56 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
73. 
57 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
74. 
58 N. PETIT, “Price squeezes with positive margins in EU competition law: economic and legal 
anatomy of a zombie”, SSRN 2014, 1. 
59 N. PETIT, “Price squeezes with positive margins in EU competition law: economic and legal 
anatomy of a zombie”, SSRN 2014, 10 p. (who holds the theory is both economically and legally 
invalid); C. BERGQVIST and J. TOWNSEND, “Enforcing Margin Squeeze Ex Post Across Converging 
Telecommunications Markets”, Konkurrensverkets Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2015:2, 21-
22 (who concur). 
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Post Danmark60, where the ECJ defined “a zone of antitrust immunity for above 
cost pricing conduct under Article 102 TFEU.”61 The ECJ stated that, “as a 
general rule”, pricing above costs is lawful for a dominant firm because equally 
efficient competitors can profitably stay in the market.62 The deviation from this 
general rule in relation to margin squeeze may be explained by regulatory 
objectives.63 
 
4.6. TELEFÓNICA 
 
32. DETERMINE, CONFIRM, REAFFIRM – The most recent margin squeeze 
case before the ECJ concerned Telefónica, a Spanish telecom operator.64 As in 
the Deutsche Telekom case, the infringer previously held the state 
telecommunications monopoly. The ECJ reaffirmed every important principle 
it established or confirmed in the Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera judgments.  
 
33. STAND-ALONE ABUSE – First of all, margin squeeze constitutes an 
independent form of abuse. Specifically, margin squeeze is a “form of abuse 
distinct from that of refusal to supply, to which the criteria established in Bronner65 
are not applicable.”66 
 
34. AS-EFFICIENT-COMPETITOR TEST 2.0 REVISITED – Secondly, the 
appellants claimed that the General Court erred in law in its assessment of the 
abuse. The ECJ rejected the claim, confirming the General Court’s as-efficient-
competitor test:67 
 
“[T]he appropriate test for establishing the margin squeeze consist[s] in determining 
whether a competitor having the same cost structure as that of the downstream activity of the 
vertically integrated undertaking would be in a position to offer downstream services without 
incurring a loss if that vertically integrated undertaking had to pay the upstream access price 
charged to its competitors.”68 
 
                                                 
60 ECJ 27 March 2012, case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, Post Danmark, ECR 2012, 0. 
61 N. PETIT, “Price squeezes with positive margins in EU competition law: economic and legal 
anatomy of a zombie”, SSRN 2014, 6. 
62 ECJ 27 March 2012, case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, Post Danmark, ECR 2012, 0, para. 
38; N. PETIT, “Price squeezes with positive margins in EU competition law: economic and legal 
anatomy of a zombie”, SSRN 2014, 7. 
63 Infra nr. 92 “MARKET ENTRY”. 
64 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication; 
GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0; ECJ 19 
December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 0. 
65 ECJ 6 November 1998, case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, ECR 1998, 
I-7791, the landmark case establishing the criteria to assess a refusal to deal. 
66 ECJ 19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 0, para. 
96. 
67 ECJ 19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 0, paras 
104-105. 
68 GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0, para. 194. 
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35. ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECT – The ECJ then elaborated on the 
requirement of anti-competitive effect. It reiterated that the potential to exclude 
as efficient competitors suffices, which means that evidence of actual effects is 
not necessary: 
 
“[I]n order to establish that a practice such as margin squeeze is abusive, that practice must 
have an anti-competitive effect on the market, although the effect does not necessarily have 
to be concrete, it being sufficient to demonstrate that there is a potential anti-competitive 
effect which may exclude competitors who are at least as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking.”69 
 
The ECJ sets out the reason for this policy in the Microsoft case.70 It would 
undermine the effectiveness of Art. 102 TFEU if a competition authority or 
claimant had to wait until harm had eventuated before taking action against 
anti-competitive conduct.71 In the same sense, criminal law does not have to wait 
for a dead body. The objective of Art. 102 TFEU is to maintain undistorted 
competition in the common market and, in particular, to safeguard the 
competition that still exists on the relevant market.72 
 
4.7. RECENT COMMISSION ACTIVITY 
 
4.7.1. Deutsche Bahn 
 
36. DEUTSCHE BAHN – The Deutsche Bahn case did not make it past the 
Commission, as the (alleged) infringer settled it with commitments.73 But even 
in its very short preliminary assessment, the Commission closely stuck to the 
theory. It voiced its concern that the spread between the price charged to 
competitors for traction current (wholesale product) and the price charged to 
consumers for rail transport (retail product), may prevent equally efficient 
competitors to trade profitably.74 Then, the Commission remarked that this is 
liable to hinder the maintenance of the degree of competition existing in the 
                                                 
69 ECJ 19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 0, para. 
124. 
70 ECJ 17 September 2007, case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, Microsoft, ECR 2007, II-3601. 
71 ECJ 17 September 2007, case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, Microsoft, ECR 2007, II-3601, 
para. 561; V. ROSE and D. BAILEY (eds.), Bellamy & Child’s European Union Law of Competition, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2013, 788. 
72 ECJ 17 September 2007, case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, Microsoft, ECR 2007, II-3601, 
para. 561. 
73 EC 18 December 2013, cases AT.39678 and AT.39731, Deutsche Bahn I and II, no integral OJ 
publication. Doctrine also picked up the case, see T. STEINVORTH, “Deutsche Bahn: Commitments 
End Margin Squeeze Investigation” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2014, 628-630 
and U. SCHOLZ and S. PURPS, “The Application of EU Competition Law in the Energy Sector” in 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2015, 203-204. Note that the Commission settled another 
margin squeeze case with commitments in 2009, see EC 18 March 2009, case COMP/39.402, RWE 
Gas Foreclosure, no integral OJ publication. As in Slovak Telekom (infra title 4.7.2 “Slovak Telekom”), the 
margin squeeze was secondary to the refusal of supply. 
74 EC 18 December 2013, cases AT.39678 and AT.39731, Deutsche Bahn I and II, no integral OJ 
publication, paras 49-53. 
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downstream market […] or the growth of that competition”, thereby 
establishing (potential) anti-competitive effect.75 
 
4.7.2. Slovak Telekom 
 
37. SLOVAK TELEKOM – In the most recent margin squeeze case, Slovak 
Telekom was fined together with its parent company Deutsche Telekom.76 The 
abuse consisted mainly of a refusal to supply. Additionally, Slovak Telekom 
abused its dominant position to commit margin squeeze. In its decision, the 
Commission stuck neatly (and very explicitly) to the existing case law. Dealing 
with margin squeeze as an independent abuse,77 the Commission used the as-
efficient-competitor test and established anti-competitive effect.78 
 
4.8. COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITY 
 
38. COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITY – Fulfilling the margin 
squeeze conditions will not necessarily lead to an investigation. Before the 
Commission assesses a margin squeeze, the situation must lie within its priorities. 
In its Guidance Paper, the Commission states it will consider margin squeeze as 
an enforcement priority “if all the following circumstances are present: 
— the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete 
effectively on a downstream market, 
— the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream 
market, and 
— the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm.”79 
 
The question, however, is whether the Commission sticks to these – at first sight 
pretty rigorous – criteria. Whether the input should be indispensable (criterion 
1) is particularly subject to debate, and will be discussed below.80 As for the other 
two criteria, the case law shows an evolution. In its decisions leading up to the 
publication of the enforcement priority (Telefónica and RWE Gas Foreclosure), the 
Commission does seem to have that in mind. Especially in Telefónica, it 
specifically mentions that the margin squeeze was capable of foreclosing 
competition in the retail market (criterion 2), and has harmed consumers 
                                                 
75 EC 18 December 2013, cases AT.39678 and AT.39731, Deutsche Bahn I and II, no integral OJ 
publication, paras 55-63 (quote from para. 57). 
76 EC 15 October 2014, case AT.39523, Slovak Telekom, no integral OJ publication; discussed in A. 
BAVASO and D. LONG, “The Application of Competition Law in the Communications and Media 
Sector: A Survey of 2014 Cases” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2015, 13-14. 
77 EC 15 October 2014, case AT.39523, Slovak Telekom, no integral OJ publication, para. 822. 
78 EC 15 October 2014, case AT.39523, Slovak Telekom, no integral OJ publication, paras 223-224, 
229-230 and paras 825, 1046-1109, respectively.  
79 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 81. 
80  Infra nr. 61-64, and especially nr. 62 “COMMISSION: OSCAR BRONNER OR ‘TELEFÓNICA 
EXCEPTIONS’”. 
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(criterion 3). 81  However, in subsequent decisions (Deutsche Bahn and Slovak 
Telekom), these criteria are given no particular attention.82 Given this evolution, 
the Commission enforcement priority cannot currently be relied on. 
 
4.9. CONCLUSION 
 
39. FROM CHAOS TO ORDER – In National Carbonising, its first encounter 
with margin squeeze, the Commission created uncertainty. The Commission 
then got it right in Napier Brown, creating legal certainty with the as-efficient-
competitor test. In an apparent moment of confusion, the CFI returned to legal 
uncertainty in its IPS judgment. In a series of judgments (Deutsche Telekom, 
TeliaSonera, Telefónica), however, the Commission and the European courts 
adopted a rational margin squeeze theory. The Commission has not deviated 
from that theory in recent decisions (Deutsche Bahn, Slovak Telekom). Given this 
string of consistency, one may presume the current theory is here to stay. 
 
 
5. AS-EFFICIENT-COMPETITOR TEST 
 
40. AS-EFFICIENT-COMPETITOR TEST – As noted above,83 the Commission 
defines margin squeeze as the situation where a dominant undertaking charges 
“a price for the product on the upstream market which, compared to the price 
it charges on the downstream market, does not allow even an equally efficient 
competitor to trade profitably in the downstream market on a lasting basis.”84  
 
41. COSTS AND PRICES DOMINANT UNDERTAKING – To evaluate if an 
equally efficient competitor can trade profitably, we first need to know its costs 
and prices. How do the Commission and the European courts determine these 
costs and prices? As a general rule, reference is made to the costs and prices of 
the dominant undertaking itself.85 This approach conforms to the principle of 
legal certainty, as an undertaking knows its own costs and prices, but not those 
                                                 
81 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
para. 8, but see also EC 18 March 2009, case COMP/39.402, RWE Gas Foreclosure, no integral OJ 
publication, paras 33-36 and 36, respectively. 
82 Their consideration is virtually absent in EC 18 December 2013, cases AT.39678 and AT.39731, 
Deutsche Bahn I and II, no integral OJ publication, and only surfaces in EC 15 October 2014, case 
AT.39523, Slovak Telekom, no integral OJ publication, paras 1046-1183 (finding potential anti-
competitive effect) and 1183 (finding a claim alleging the absence of consumer harm unfounded). 
83 Supra nr. 18 “DEFINITION”. 
84 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 80 (italics 
added). 
85 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 200; ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, 
I-527, para. 41; GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 
0, para. 190. 
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of its competitors. This way, the dominant undertaking can assess the lawfulness 
of its conduct.86 
 
42. PROFITABLE TRADE – In particular, it is examined whether the 
dominant undertaking could offer its retail product to end-users profitably if it 
were obliged to pay the price it charges its downstream competitors for the 
wholesale product87  If, given that cost, the dominant undertaking would be 
unable to offer its retail product profitably, that would mean competitors who 
might be excluded by the pricing practice cannot be considered less efficient 
than the dominant undertaking.88 This risk of exclusion would be the result of 
distorted competition, i.e. competition that is not based solely on the respective 
merits of the undertakings concerned.89 
 
43. COSTS AND PRICES COMPETITORS – However, the ECJ does not rule 
out that the costs and prices of competitors may be relevant to the examination 
of the pricing practice. The scope for this deviation is rather limited, which the 
ECJ explains by stating that “any other approach than relying on the dominant 
undertaking’s prices and costs could be contrary to the general principle of legal 
certainty.”90  
 
Only where it is not possible, in particular circumstances, to refer to the costs 
and prices of the dominant undertaking, should the costs and prices of its 
competitors on the same market be examined.91 The ECJ has designated three 
situations where this might particularly be the case: 
1. “Where the cost structure of the dominant undertaking is not 
precisely identifiable for objective reasons”; 
2. “Where the service supplied to competitors consists in the mere use 
of an infrastructure the production cost of which has already been 
written off, so that access to such an infrastructure no longer represents 
a cost for the dominant undertaking which is economically comparable 
to the cost which its competitors have to incur to have access to it”; 
                                                 
86 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 202; ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, 
I-527, para. 44; GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 
0, para. 192. 
87 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 201; ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, 
I-527, para. 42; GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 
0, para. 191. 
88 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
43. 
89 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
43. 
90 CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-477, 
para. 192; ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 
2010, I-9555, para. 143. 
91 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
46; GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0, para. 193. 
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3. “Where the particular market conditions of competition dictate it, by 
reason, for example, of the fact that the level of the dominant 
undertaking’s costs is specifically attributable to the competitively 
advantageous situation in which its dominant position places it”.92 
 
44. PRODUCT BUNDLES – Telecom operators offer a wide range of products 
with a correspondingly wide range of prices. This has lead the Commission to 
ask at which aggregation level the margin squeeze test should be applied: either 
at the highest level of detail (i.e. at the level of each individual product) or at the 
aggregate portfolio level (i.e. at the level of the mix of products marketed on the 
retail market).93 
 
In Deutsche Telekom, the Commission and the European courts chose to assess 
every product (access and call services) separately. 94  Deutsche Telekom 
protested this method, arguing that the decisive consideration is the point of view 
of the end-user, and thus the bundle of products.95 However, the Commission 
responded that “[t]he primary consideration here is the effect on market entry 
by competitors, and not the question whether the end-user regards access 
services and calls as a single bundle of products.” 96  This is thus the more 
competitor-friendly approach. But as these products are virtually always 
bundled, it could be argued that this approach disregards the economic reality.97 
 
Conversely, in Telefónica and Slovak Telekom, the Commission chose to conduct 
the margin squeeze test on the basis of an ‘aggregated approach’, i.e. on the basis 
of the product bundles offered by the telecom operators on the retail market.98 
This is more favourable to the incumbent, since it gives it maximal flexibility to 
                                                 
92 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
45. 
93 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
para. 386; EC 15 October 2014, case AT.39523, Slovak Telekom, no integral OJ publication, para. 
831. 
94  EC 21 May 2003, case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263, 
14.10.2003, 9, paras 117, 119-120; CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, 
Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-477, paras 195-197; Opinion of AG MAZÁK 22 April 2010, case C-
280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:212, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-9555, para. 55; ECJ 14 October 
2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-9555, 226. 
95  EC 21 May 2003, case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263, 
14.10.2003, 9, para. 117. 
96  EC 21 May 2003, case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263, 
14.10.2003, 9, para. 127. 
97 R. O’DONOGHUE, “Regulating the Regulated: Deutsche Telekom v. European Commission” in Global 
Competition Policy 2008, 16; G. HAY and K. MCMAHON, “The diverging approach to price squeezes 
in the United States and Europe” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2012, 274-275. 
98 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
paras 386-388; EC 15 October 2014, case AT.39523, Slovak Telekom, no integral OJ publication, 
paras 831-842. 
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spread the costs that are common to its retail products.99 Entrants are forced to 
assess the profitability of their investment by considering the complete range of 
products they are able to offer. 100  But, as BERGQVIST and TOWNSEND 
demonstrate, this aggregated approach may give dominant undertakings an 
opportunity to ‘muddle’ the margins, thereby escaping an otherwise positive 
finding of margin squeeze.101 
 
When will the Commission use the individual approach, and when will it use the 
aggregated one? This depends on whether competitors are able to profitably 
replicate the incumbent’s product pattern.102 So the question is: are competitors 
able to offer what the incumbent offers? Since the unbundling of the local loop, 
this is technically always the case.103 It may be inferred that, in the future, the 
Commission will only compare product bundles. 
 
 
6. UNDERTAKINGS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MARGIN 
SQUEEZE 
 
45. INTRODUCTION – By looking for common traits, this chapter tries to 
put together a profile of the companies engaging in margin squeeze. The 
question is then raised why certain sectors are more susceptible to margin 
squeeze than others. 
 
6.1. COMMON TRAITS 
 
46. HOU’S HYPOTHESIS – HOU indicates that “[t]he limited number of case 
laws seems not to suggest that every vertically integrated dominant undertaking 
could engage in price squeeze, but that only some can.”104 He presents the thesis 
that to engage in a margin squeeze, an undertaking must 
1. have at least super-dominance or quasi-monopoly on the upstream 
market; 
                                                 
99 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
para. 388; EC 15 October 2014, case AT.39523, Slovak Telekom, no integral OJ publication, paras 
832. 
100 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
para. 388. 
101 C. BERGQVIST and J. TOWNSEND, “Enforcing Margin Squeeze Ex Post Across Converging 
Telecommunications Markets”, Konkurrensverkets Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2015:2, 24-
25. 
102 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
para. 388; EC 15 October 2014, case AT.39523, Slovak Telekom, no integral OJ publication, para. 
832; in the same sense, but without reference to the Commission practice, Z. BIRO, G. HOUPIS and 
M. HUNT, “Applying Margin Squeeze in Telecommunications: Some Economic Insights” in Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice 2011, 590-591. 
103 EC 15 October 2014, case AT.39523, Slovak Telekom, no integral OJ publication, para. 836. 
104 L. HOU, “Some aspects of price squeeze within the EU: a case law analysis” in European Competition 
Law Review 2011, 2. 
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2. be under an obligation to supply downstream competitors; and 
3. be dominant on the downstream market.105 
This thesis is attractive to vertically integrated undertakings, as it would allow 
them to assess their conduct with more certainty. 
 
47. THE ECJ’S REALITY – However, case law has proven this thesis wrong. 
But while HOU’s profile is legally incorrect, it may have practical merit. 
 
1. At least super-dominance on the upstream market. Dominance on the upstream 
market is a minimum requirement for margin squeeze liability. Evidently, there 
needs to be a dominant position to be abused. However, the ECJ does not 
require super-dominance. In that regard, it has stated that “the degree of 
dominance in the market concerned is not relevant”. 106  Then again, an 
undertaking with a 40% market share cannot have an indispensable input (infra 
2), unless other actors face significant capacity constraints. In the same sense, 
other authors argue that the dominant position of the incumbent must be 
unassailable for the foreclosure to be effective.107 
 
2. Obligation to supply downstream competitors. The ECJ does not require an 
obligation to supply to find a dominant undertaking liable for margin squeeze,108 
but notes that, without an indispensable input, there may be no anti-competitive 
effect.109 Moreover, the Commission requires the input to be essential for margin 
squeeze to be an enforcement priority (at least formally).110 Consequently, the 
Commission concedes that one common feature in margin squeeze cases has 
been the objective necessity of that input for effective competition on the 
downstream market.111 The relation between margin squeeze and refusal to 
supply will be discussed extensively later on in this paper.112 
 
                                                 
105 L. HOU, “Some aspects of price squeeze within the EU: a case law analysis” in European Competition 
Law Review 2011, 5-6. 
106 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
82. 
107 L. COLLEY and S. BURNSIDE, “Margin Squeeze Abuse” in European Competition Law Journal 2006, 
202-203; C. BERGQVIST and J. TOWNSEND, “Enforcing Margin Squeeze Ex Post Across 
Converging Telecommunications Markets”, Konkurrensverkets Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 
2015:2, 5. 
108 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, paras 
54-59; ECJ 19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 0, 
paras 180-182 and 184; contra, Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, paras 8-33 (infra title 7.4 “Constructive refusal 
to supply”). 
109 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, paras 
69-72. 
110 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 81 (supra 
title 4.8 “Commission enforcement priority”). 
111 OECD, Roundtable on Margin Squeeze, DAF/COMP (2009) 36, 256. 
112 Infra title 7.4 “Constructive refusal to supply”. 
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3. Dominance on the downstream market. The ECJ has held that dominance on the 
downstream market is not a condition for margin squeeze liability. 113 However, 
the European courts do require margin squeeze to have an anti-competitive 
effect.114 When the vertically integrated undertaking is not dominant on the 
downstream market, exclusion of competitors on that market, and thus anti-
competitive effect, seems less likely. 
 
6.2. SUSCEPTIBLE SECTORS 
 
48. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR – Four out of the eight previously 
discussed cases 115  originated in the telecom industry. 116  BIRO, HOUPIS and 
HUNT find the reason for this in the EU liberalisation model for the 
telecommunications market.117 This liberalisation model reflects the concept of 
a ‘ladder of investment’, where access to different levels (‘steps’) of an 
incumbent’s network has been mandated. Entrants are expected to climb the 
ladder over time by undertaking more significant investments. Regulation has 
therefore sought to promote downstream competition by allowing rivals to rely 
on upstream inputs based on incumbents’ networks.118 This obligation to supply 
upstream inputs to downstream competitors creates the perfect climate for 
margin squeeze.119 
 
The Commission also concedes that “margin squeeze most often occurs where 
there are dominant vertically integrated firms which were previously 
monopolists and which control access to facilities which are not easily replicable 
i.e. legacy infrastructure (such as in telecommunications).”120 In the same sense, 
the OECD concludes from its survey that many of the margin squeeze cases 
arise in newly liberalised sectors. 121  Aside from telecommunications, these 
                                                 
113 ECJ 19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 0, paras 
146 and 185; HOU recognised that dominance on the downstream market was a questionable 
criterion, but held that at least the ability to manipulate the price on the downstream market was 
required, see L. HOU, “Some aspects of price squeeze within the EU: a case law analysis” in European 
Competition Law Review 2011, 9-10. 
114 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 252; ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, 
I-527, para. 64; ECJ 19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 
2013, 0, para. 124. 
115 Broad interpretation of “cases”, also including preliminary questions. 
116 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555; ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527; 
ECJ 19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 0. 
117 Z. BIRO, G. HOUPIS and M. HUNT, “Applying Margin Squeeze in Telecommunications: Some 
Economic Insights” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2011, 590. 
118 Z. BIRO, G. HOUPIS and M. HUNT, “Applying Margin Squeeze in Telecommunications: Some 
Economic Insights” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2011, 590. 
119 The same view is held by D. GERADIN and R. O’DONOGHUE, “The concurrent application of 
competition law and regulation: the cases of margin squeeze abuses in the telecommunications sector” 
in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2005, 360 and 409. 
120 OECD, Roundtable on Margin Squeeze, DAF/COMP (2009) 36, 295. 
121 OECD, Roundtable on Margin Squeeze, DAF/COMP (2009) 36, 8. 
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include the water sector, railways, postal services, pharmaceuticals, pay 
television, gasoline and funeral services.122  
 
 
7. COMPETITION LAW APPROACH TO MARGIN 
SQUEEZE 
 
49. INTRODUCTION – In this chapter, we delve deeper into the competition 
law approach to margin squeeze. As discussed earlier, 123 the ECJ conceives 
margin squeeze as a stand-alone abuse. But are there other possibilities? And 
what can we learn from the US approach? 
 
7.1. ATLANTIC DIVIDE 
 
50. EUROPEAN UNION – Although different undertakings may be involved 
in case of a margin squeeze124, these undertakings will usually constitute a single 
economic entity.125 This way, margin squeeze must be examined under Art. 102 
TFEU, prohibiting an abuse of a dominant position of said economic entity as a 
whole. The next question is under which heading of Art. 102 TFEU the margin 
squeeze belongs. Authors and judges have held that margin squeeze is a form of 
price discrimination, predatory pricing, constructive refusal to deal… Or is the 
ECJ right by conceiving margin squeeze as a stand-alone abuse?126 
 
51. UNITED STATES – US antitrust law may also provide insight as to the 
position of margin squeeze in competition law, as it conceives margin squeeze 
differently than European law. The US Supreme Court requires a refusal to deal 
or predatory pricing to establish a margin squeeze. The Supreme Court 
articulated its standpoint very clearly in the linkLine judgment: 
  
“The problem, however, is that amici have not identified any independent competitive harm 
caused by price squeezes above and beyond the harm that would result from a duty-to-deal 
violation at the wholesale level or predatory pricing at the retail level. […] To the extent a 
                                                 
122 OECD, Roundtable on Margin Squeeze, DAF/COMP (2009) 36, 8. 
123 Supra nr. 29, 33, 36-37; infra title 7.5 “Stand-alone abuse”. 
124 The dominant undertaking can sell directly on the downstream market or through one or more 
of its subsidiaries. 
125 The parent company and its subsidiaries qualify as one economic entity, see CFI 10 July 1990, 
case T-51/89, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41, Tetra Pak I, ECR 1990, II-309. 
126 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 183; Advocate General MAZÁK shares the same point of view, see Opinion of AG 
MAZÁK 22 April 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:212, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-9555, 
para. 44; ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, 
para. 31; ECJ 19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 
0, para. 96. 
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monopolist violates one of these doctrines, the plaintiffs have a remedy under existing law. 
We do not need to endorse a new theory of liability to prevent such harm.”127  
 
Evidently, this judgment has not escaped criticism either.128 
 
7.2. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
 
52. ABUSE – Art. 102, c) TFEU prohibits price discrimination, and 
describes this practice as “applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage.” Where the dominant undertaking charges a higher input price 
to its competitors than its downstream subsidiary, this may constitute anti-
competitive price discrimination.129 The European institutions have looked at 
possible130 margin squeezes through the lens of price discrimination numerous 
times.131  
53. RECENT EXAMPLES – In the case of RWE Gas Foreclosure, the dominant 
undertaking, RWE, discriminated between its own downstream operations and 
its competitors through a system of rebates.132 These – high – rebates were 
theoretically also available to competitors, but in practice almost only RWE 
benefited from its rebate scheme. This way, RWE squeezed its competitors’ 
margins.133 In the aforementioned Deutsche Bahn case, rebates were also at the 
                                                 
127 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 15. 
128 To get a sense of both ends of the spectrum, see W. CARLTON, “Should “price squeeze” be a 
recognized form of anticompetitive conduct?” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2008, 271-
278 (who is against any theory at all) versus E. HOVENKAMP and H. HOVENKAMP, “The Viability 
of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims” in Arizona Law Review 2009, 273-304 (who believe the theory 
should be broadened) and E. MERIWETHER, “Putting the “Squeeze” on Refusal to Deal Cases: 
Lessons from Trinko and LinkLine” in Antitrust Law Journal 2010, 65-74 (who also criticises the 
narrow avenues claimants are left with under the current theory). 
129 G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European 
Competition Law Journal 2010, 257; N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: theory, practice, policy – part I” in 
European Competition Law Review 2012, 3. 
130  Meaning that the situation under investigation closely resembled a margin squeeze. The 
European institutions did not always label it that way, but the doctrine was often less prudent. For 
an overview, see D. GERADIN and N. PETIT, “Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law: 
The Need for a case- by-case Approach” in The Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series 2005, 
29-32. 
131 CFI 21 October 1997, case T-229/94, ECLI:EU:T:1997:155, Deutsche Bahn, ECR 1997, II-1689; 
interestingly, Deutsche Bahn recently ended a similar case with commitments, see EC 18 December 
2013, cases AT.39678 and AT.39731, Deutsche Bahn I and II, no integral OJ publication (supra title 
4.7 “Deutsche Bahn”);  EC 18 March 2009, case COMP/39.402, RWE Gas Foreclosure, no integral 
OJ publication; see also EC, Press Release, “Settlement reached with Belgacom on the publication 
of telephone directories - ITT withdraws complaint”, Brussels, 11 April 1997, and EC 20 March 
2001, case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post, OJ L 125, 05.05.2001, 27. 
132 EC 18 March 2009, case COMP/39.402, RWE Gas Foreclosure, no integral OJ publication, para. 
34. 
133 EC 18 March 2009, case COMP/39.402, RWE Gas Foreclosure, no integral OJ publication, para. 
34. 
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heart of the margin squeeze. 134  Again only in practice, these rebates 
discriminated between Deutsche Bahn’s own downstream operations and its 
competitors. 135  The Commission concluded that “the pricing system […], 
including its discounts, fulfils the conditions necessary for finding a margin 
squeeze.”136   
 
54. SHORTFALLS – There are, however, a number of objections against this 
theory. Firstly, not every vertically integrated undertaking uses a subsidiary. If 
the vertically integrated undertaking does not operate through such a subsidiary, 
but sells directly on the downstream market, there can be no price discrimination. 
Secondly, vertically integrated undertakings that do work with subsidiaries can 
easily circumvent the price discrimination assessment. The dominant 
undertaking may choose to charge its downstream subsidiaries and its 
downstream competitors equally. This way, profits are made at the wholesale 
level and not at the retail level. This loophole can be closed by combining price 
discrimination with predatory pricing. A third counterargument may be the 
difficulty of establishing price discrimination.137 
 
7.3. PREDATORY PRICING 
 
55. ABUSE – When the dominant undertaking charges its downstream 
subsidiaries and competitors equally, it can still drive competitors from the 
market by taking advantage of its vertical integration. The downstream 
subsidiaries can price the goods or services below the transfer price they pay.138 
This conduct would be captured by the abuse of predatory pricing. 139 
Exceptionally, however, this below-cost pricing does not mean the undertaking 
has to suffer losses.140 
 
56. US AND EU JURISPRUDENCE – The US Supreme Court requires 
predation at the retail level (or a duty to deal at the wholesale level) to establish 
                                                 
134 EC 18 December 2013, cases AT.39678 and AT.39731, Deutsche Bahn I and II, no integral OJ 
publication, paras 22-26 (supra title 4.7 “Deutsche Bahn”). 
135 EC 18 December 2013, cases AT.39678 and AT.39731, Deutsche Bahn I and II, no integral OJ 
publication, para. 25. 
136 EC 18 December 2013, cases AT.39678 and AT.39731, Deutsche Bahn I and II, no integral OJ 
publication, para. 42. 
137 R. O’DONOGHUE and J. PADILLA, The Law & Economics of Article 102 TFEU, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2013, 339; price discrimination is even absent from the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities (Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20), as 
remarked by PETIT, see N. PETIT, “Price squeezes with positive margins in EU competition law: 
economic and legal anatomy of a zombie”, SSRN 2014, 9. 
138  D. PETZOLD, “It Is All Predatory Pricing: Margin Squeeze Abuse and the Concept of 
Opportunity Costs in EU Competition Law” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2015, 2-
3, where he gives an illuminating example. 
139 ECJ 3 July 1991, case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, AKZO Chemie, ECR 1991, I-3359, paras 
71-72 (supra nr. 17 “AKZO CHEMIE: CRITERIA”). 
140 Infra nr. 57 “SHORTFALLS”. 
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a price squeeze.141 It must be noted that in the IPS case, the CFI also looked for 
predation at the wholesale and retail level.142 However, the European courts 
have abandoned this kind of test in their recent jurisprudence. In Deutsche Telekom, 
for example, the ECJ decided that it was not necessary to establish “that the 
wholesale prices for local loop access services or retail prices for end-user access 
services were in themselves abusive on account of their excessive or predatory 
nature, as the case may be.”143 
 
57. SHORTFALLS – The predation approach has a lot of advocates, 
including PETZOLD144, COLLEY & BURNSIDE145, SIDAK146, CARLTON147, and 
FAELLA & PARDOLESI 148 . Predatory pricing is generally seen as the most 
adequate alternative for a separate theory of margin squeeze abuse. However, 
seeing margin squeeze (exclusively) as a case of predation has its deficiencies. 
 
Price identification. The most evident shortfall is that this theory does not cover the 
situation where the vertically integrated undertaking does not operate through 
a subsidiary. As there may be no internal transfer charges in a single vertically 
integrated entity, identifying a predatory price may turn out to be impossible.149 
 
Price discrimination. The predation theory does cover the situation where the 
dominant undertaking charges a higher input price to its competitors and a 
lower price to its subsidiaries. When the subsidiaries then charge a price above 
the costs they bear, there is no predation.150 This price can still be lower than 
the price downstream competitors have to charge to avoid losses. However, as 
noted above,151 this situation is covered by the abuse of price discrimination (Art. 
                                                 
141 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 10-12, with reference to Supreme Court of the United States 21 
June 1993, docket no. 92-466, Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
142 CFI 30 November 2000, case T-5/97, ECLI:EU:T:2000:278, Industries des Poudres Sphériques (IPS), 
ECR 2000, II-3755, para. 179. 
143 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 183. 
144  D. PETZOLD, “It Is All Predatory Pricing: Margin Squeeze Abuse and the Concept of 
Opportunity Costs in EU Competition Law” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2015, 5 
p. 
145 L. COLLEY and S. BURNSIDE, “Margin Squeeze Abuse” in European Competition Law Journal 2006, 
185-210. 
146 J. SIDAK, “Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability” in Journal of Competition 
Law & Economics 2008, 279-309. 
147 W. CARLTON, “Should “price squeeze” be a recognized form of anticompetitive conduct?” in 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2008, 271-278. 
148 G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European 
Competition Law Journal 2010, 255-284. 
149 G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European 
Competition Law Journal 2010, 259. 
150 Above-cost pricing would not pass the predation test, as the ECJ requires an undertaking to 
charge prices at least below the total average cost of the undertaking in order to establish predation, 
see ECJ 3 July 1991, case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, AKZO Chemie, ECR 1991, I-3359, paras 
71-72 (supra nr. 17 “AKZO CHEMIE: CRITERIA”). 
151 Supra nr. 54 “SHORTFALLS”. 
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102, c) TFEU). FAELLA and PARDOLESI agree that “[i]f there is neither 
downstream predation nor upstream discrimination, there is no risk of exclusion 
of equally efficient competitors.”152 They notice that “we are then left with the 
possibility that the upstream price to non-integrated rivals is excessive under 
Article 102(a) TFEU, which would be true whether or not there were a separate 
abuse of margin squeeze.” 153  Excessive pricing is more often mentioned to 
supplement a margin squeeze theory.154 
 
Costless predation. The real difference between predatory pricing and margin 
squeeze becomes apparent when one looks at the long-term viability of these 
strategies. When engaging in predatory pricing, a dominant undertaking 
necessarily suffers losses in the short term, to then recoup these losses after 
driving competitors off the market.155 But margin squeeze does not require such 
a trade-off.156 The losses that the subsidiary incurs by selling below transfer price 
are compensated by the profits of the parent company. In the end, the group 
balance is still positive, which is why this practice is called ‘costless predation’.157 
So, while this strategy can remain profitable, it can drive as efficient competitors 
off the market, as they incur losses they cannot recover from a wholesale level. 
This then opens the door for price elevation. 
 
58. OPPORTUNITY COSTS – In any case, a theory of margin squeeze based 
solely on predation seems unworkable. PETZOLD disagrees. In line with the US 
                                                 
152 G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European 
Competition Law Journal 2010, 259. 
153 G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European 
Competition Law Journal 2010, 258-259. 
154  D. GERADIN and R. O’DONOGHUE, “The concurrent application of competition law and 
regulation: the cases of margin squeeze abuses in the telecommunications sector” in Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 2005, 365-366; M. RAUBER and N. DELLAFIOR, “Case C-52/09, 
Konkurrentsverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, [2011] ECR I-527 - confirming an inappropriate 
assessment framework for margin squeeze” in European Competition Law Review 2013, 4. 
155 Recoupment (or the chance thereof) is not a strict legal requirement, see ECJ 14 November 1996, 
case C-333/94 P, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436, Tetra Pak II, ECR I-5951, para. 44. However, it may still 
be required in fact, see L. COLLEY and S. BURNSIDE, “Margin Squeeze Abuse” in European 
Competition Law Journal 2006, 190. On why it should be required, see P. SICILIANI, “Exclusionary 
pricing and consumers harm: the European Commission’s practice in the DSL market” in Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 2007, 255. 
156  D. GERADIN and R. O’DONOGHUE, “The concurrent application of competition law and 
regulation: the cases of margin squeeze abuses in the telecommunications sector” in Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 2005, 367; L. BRAVO and P. SICILIANI, “Exclusionary pricing and 
consumers harm: the European Commission’s practice in the DSL market” in Journal of Competition 
Law & Economics 2007, 248; D. PETZOLD, “It Is All Predatory Pricing: Margin Squeeze Abuse and 
the Concept of Opportunity Costs in EU Competition Law” in Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 2015, 2-3, where he gives an illuminating example. The OECD describes a similar process, 
see OECD, Roundtable on Margin Squeeze, DAF/COMP (2009) 36, 9. Conversely, COLLEY & 
BURNSIDE argue margin squeeze does require (incremental) losses, see L. COLLEY and S. BURNSIDE, 
“Margin Squeeze Abuse” in European Competition Law Journal 2006, 2. 
157 Legally, ‘costless predation’ is an oxymoron, because when an undertaking does not engage in 
below-cost pricing, it does not pass the ECJ’s predation test, see ECJ 3 July 1991, case C-62/86, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, AKZO Chemie, ECR 1991, I-3359, paras 71-72 (supra nr. 17 “AKZO CHEMIE: 
CRITERIA”). 
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Supreme Court, he argues convincingly that “the category of abuse ‘margin 
squeeze’ is redundant as there is no independent harm to competition that would 
exceed the harm which can be remedied under the existing case law governing 
predatory pricing abuses.”158 PETZOLD recognises that a margin squeeze allows 
for costless predation, but instead of filling this gap with the abuse of price 
discrimination, he factors opportunity costs in the predatory pricing 
assessment.159 
 
7.4. CONSTRUCTIVE REFUSAL TO SUPPLY  
 
59. ABUSE – In principle, undertakings are free to decide whom they deal 
with. However, a refusal to supply may be in breach of Art. 102 TFEU. The 
strict conditions of this abuse were set out in the case of Oscar Bronner.160 The 
Commission notes that a refusal typically becomes problematic when the 
dominant undertaking competes on the downstream market with the buyer 
whom it refuses to supply.161 For a finding of abuse, an actual refusal is not 
required. A ‘constructive refusal’, for example imposing unreasonable conditions 
in return for the supply, may also qualify. 162 This closely resembles margin 
squeeze. 
 
60. US: NO DUTY TO DEAL, NO PROBLEM – The US Supreme Court 
requires an antitrust duty to deal at the wholesale level (or predatory pricing at 
the retail level) in order to condemn an alleged margin squeeze. In linkLine it held 
that “if a firm has no antitrust duty to deal with its competitors at wholesale, it 
certainly has no duty to deal under terms and conditions that the rivals find 
commercially advantageous.” 163  The OECD takes account of a number of 
similar submissions pointing out that “it does not make sense to impose potential 
liability for engaging in a margin squeeze when the integrated firm has no duty 
to deal, since, in this case, the firm could avoid liability simply by refusing to sell 
                                                 
158  D. PETZOLD, “It Is All Predatory Pricing: Margin Squeeze Abuse and the Concept of 
Opportunity Costs in EU Competition Law” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2015, 1. 
159  D. PETZOLD, “It Is All Predatory Pricing: Margin Squeeze Abuse and the Concept of 
Opportunity Costs in EU Competition Law” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2015, 3-
4. 
160 ECJ 6 November 1998, case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, ECR 
1998, I-7791, paras 40-46. 
161 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, 2005, para. 209; Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 
24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 76. 
162 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 79. 
163 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 9, with reference to Supreme Court of the United States 13 January 
2004, docket no. 02–682, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. Note that 
it has to be an antitrust duty to deal; a duty to deal imposed by the regulator does not qualify. Besides 
Trinko, the landmark case on refusal to deal in the US is Supreme Court of the United States 19 June 
1985, docket no. 84-510, Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing. 
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the essential input at all.”164 Because of its simple logic, this argument seems hard 
to counter. 
 
61. EU: EVOLUTION – In the EU, the relation between margin squeeze and 
refusal to supply has been heavily debated. The Commission, the Advocate 
General and the European courts all weighed in on the issue, each with a 
different point of view. Evidently, the doctrine chose a side. The question was: 
does margin squeeze require (i) the input to be indispensable (Oscar Bronner); (ii) 
a regulatory obligation to supply? 
 
62. COMMISSION: OSCAR BRONNER OR ‘TELEFÓNICA EXCEPTIONS’ – 
The early case law did not explicitly discuss the relationship between margin 
squeeze and refusal to supply. However, both Napier Brown and IPS show a close 
connection between the two abuses.165 In its Guidance Paper, the Commission 
stated that, for it to pursue a case, the practice would have to meet three criteria 
that effectively mirror those established in Oscar Bronner.166 Thus, the input would 
have to be indispensable. 
 
When the issue came up in Telefónica, however, the Commission took the view 
that the particular circumstances of the case fundamentally differed from those 
in Oscar Bronner.167 It held that the Oscar Bronner test must not be met, as (i) 
Telefónica was under a regulatory duty to supply the wholesale product; and (ii) 
the investment in Telefónica’s infrastructure had been undertaken while special 
or exclusive rights shielded it from competition. 168  These two ‘Telefónica 
exceptions’ also made their way into the Guidance Paper.169 
 
                                                 
164 OECD, Roundtable on Margin Squeeze, DAF/COMP (2009) 36, 8. 
165 EC 18 July 1988, case IV/30.178, Napier Brown – British Sugar, OJ L 284, 19.10.1988, 41 (where 
the Commission found both a margin squeeze and a refusal to supply); CFI 30 November 2000, case 
T-5/97, ECLI:EU:T:2000:278, Industries des Poudres Sphériques (IPS), ECR 2000, II-3755 (where the 
availability of alternative resources was an important reason to reject the margin squeeze allegation). 
166 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 81. 
167 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
para. 302. 
168 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
paras 303-309. 
169 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, 7-20, para. 82. These 
‘Telefónica exceptions’ have been criticised, see G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price 
Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European Competition Law Journal 2010, 273; D. GERADIN, 
“Refusal to supply and margin squeeze: A discussion of why the “Telefónica Exceptions” are Wrong” 
in TILEC Discussion Paper Series 2011, 10 p; H. AUF’MKOLK, “The ‘Feedback Effect’ of Applying EU 
Competition Law to Regulated Industries: Doctrinal Contamination in the Case of Margin Squeeze” 
in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2012, 155. 
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63. AG MAZÁK: OSCAR BRONNER OR REGULATORY OBLIGATION TO 
SUPPLY – In TeliaSonera, Advocate General MAZÁK wrote at length on the 
relation between margin squeeze and refusal to supply.170 He argues: 
 
“[A] margin squeeze is abusive only where the dominant undertaking has a regulatory 
obligation to supply the input in question or where that input is indispensable. If the 
dominant undertaking’s input is not indispensable, for instance, if there are substitutes 
available, it cannot be the subject of an abusive margin squeeze, because competitors do not 
need to acquire it, either at the dominant undertaking’s price or indeed at all.”171 
 
Thus, MAZÁK requires either (i) the indispensability of the input, in line with 
Oscar Bronner;172 or (ii) a regulatory obligation to supply. He contends that there 
is no independent competitive harm caused by the margin squeeze above and 
beyond the harm that would result from a duty-to-deal violation at the wholesale 
level.173 
 
MAZÁK’s logic to this position is remarkably similar to that of the US Supreme 
Court: 
 
“If a dominant undertaking could lawfully have refused to provide the products in question, 
then it should not be reproached for providing those products at conditions which its 
competitors may consider not advantageous.”174 
 
MAZÁK warns that, if margin squeeze were conceived any other way, there 
would be a number of negative implications. First of all, dominant undertakings’ 
willingness to invest would be reduced.175 Secondly, they would be likely to raise 
end-user prices lest they be charged with a margin squeeze. 176 Thirdly, the 
dominant undertakings would simply choose not to deal with competitors.177 
MAZÁK also recommends that Art. 102 TFEU should not be used to protect the 
                                                 
170 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, paras 8-33; R. SUBIOTTO, F. MALONE, D. LITTLE, C. DE BROSSES and C. SUCIU, 
“Recent EU Case Law Developments: Article 102 TFEU” in Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 2011, 144-145. 
171 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 11. 
172 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, paras 8-33 include multiple references to ECJ 6 November 1998, case C-7/97, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, ECR 1998, I-7791, paras 40-46. 
173 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 16. 
174 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 21; compare with Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, 
docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 9. 
175 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, paras 21 and 23. 
176 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 21. 
177 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 23. 
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position of particular competitors.178 It must be noted that a great number of 
authors endorse the same view.179 
64. ECJ: DISTINCT ABUSES – The ECJ, however, did not agree. Firstly, it 
held that his interpretation of Oscar Bronner would “amount to a requirement that 
before any conduct of a dominant undertaking in relation to its terms of trade 
could be regarded as abusive the conditions to be met to establish that there was 
a refusal to supply would in every case have to be satisfied”.180 In other words, 
every abuse would require a refusal to supply. This would make Art. 102 TFEU 
ineffective.181 Secondly, the presence of any regulatory obligation to supply is 
also irrelevant.182 In Telefónica, the ECJ reiterated that margin squeeze is a “form 
of abuse distinct from that of refusal to supply, to which the criteria established 
in Bronner are not applicable.”183 
 
  
                                                 
178 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 30. 
179  D. GERADIN and R. O’DONOGHUE, “The concurrent application of competition law and 
regulation: the cases of margin squeeze abuses in the telecommunications sector” in Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 2005, 396-399; R. O’DONOGHUE, “Regulating the Regulated: Deutsche 
Telekom v. European Commission” in Global Competition Policy 2008, 20; G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, 
“Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European Competition Law Journal 2010, 267-
273; D. GERADIN, “Refusal to supply and margin squeeze: A discussion of why the “Telefónica 
Exceptions” are Wrong” in TILEC Discussion Paper Series 2011, 10 p; H. AUF’MKOLK, “The 
‘Feedback Effect’ of Applying EU Competition Law to Regulated Industries: Doctrinal 
Contamination in the Case of Margin Squeeze” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2012, 
156-157; N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: theory, practice, policy – part II” in European Competition Law 
Review 2012, 7-8; G. HAY and K. MCMAHON, “The diverging approach to price squeezes in the 
United States and Europe” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2012, 282-285; M. HARKER, 
“EU competition law as a tool for dealing with regulatory failure: the broadband and margin squeeze 
cases” in Journal of Business Law 2013, 5-8; M. RAUBER and N. DELLAFIOR, “Case C-52/09, 
Konkurrentsverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, [2011] ECR I-527 - confirming an inappropriate 
assessment framework for margin squeeze” in European Competition Law Review 2013, 4-6; C. 
BERGQVIST and J. TOWNSEND, “Enforcing Margin Squeeze Ex Post Across Converging 
Telecommunications Markets”, Konkurrensverkets Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2015:2, 5 
and 15. 
180 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
58. 
181 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
58. 
182 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
59. 
183 GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0, para. 180; 
ECJ 19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 0, para. 96. 
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7.5. STAND-ALONE ABUSE 
 
65. INDEPENDENT ABUSE – Notwithstanding the doctrinal opposition and 
the differing US approach,184 the ECJ has decided on several occasions that 
margin squeeze constitutes an independent form of abuse.185 The ECJ holds that 
a margin squeeze results from the unfairness of the spread between an 
undertaking’s wholesale and retail prices, and not of the level of those prices as 
such.186 It clarifies that a margin squeeze may be the result not only of an 
abnormally low price in the retail market, but also of an abnormally high price 
in the wholesale market.187  
 
66. RATIO – The ECJ does not, however, explain (explicitly) why it 
recognises margin squeeze as a separate violation of Art. 102 TFEU. DUNNE 
argues that a stand-alone margin squeeze offence addresses the impact of vertical 
integration of the dominant undertaking in a way that assessing wholesale or 
retail prices separately for evidence of discrete abuses cannot. 188  FAELLA & 
PARDOLESI also argue that vertical integration, and the possible lack of internal 
transfer charges that comes with it, makes existing abuses difficult to observe.189 
That is why a separate analytical framework may be required. These suggestions 
are consistent with the earlier finding of this paper that no existing abuse can 
fully capture margin squeeze.190 The independence of margin squeeze as an 
abuse may also be explained by the objective of market entry.191 
 
67. SHORTFALLS – To which possible shortfalls is an independent (and 
broad) margin squeeze theory susceptible? The most often voiced critiques can 
be summarised as follows: 
                                                 
184 Apart from the aforementioned authors and the US Supreme Court, it is worth remarking that 
the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (formerly European Regulators 
Group) does not conceive margin squeeze as an independent abuse either, see European Regulators 
Group, Revised ERG Common Position on the approach to Appropriate remedies in the ECNS 
regulatory framework, ERG (06) 33, May 2006, 38. 
185 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 183; AG MAZÁK shares the same point of view, see Opinion of AG Mazák 22 April 
2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:212, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-9555, para. 44; ECJ 
17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 31; ECJ 
19 December 2013, case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica, ECR 2013, 0, para. 96. 
186 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 167. 
187 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
98. 
188 N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: theory, practice, policy – part II” in European Competition Law Review 
2012, 1. 
189 G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European 
Competition Law Journal 2010, 266. 
190 See “7.2 Price discrimination”, “7.3 Predatory pricing” and “7.4 Constructive refusal to deal”. 
The same conclusion is drawn in L. BRAVO and P. SICILIANI, “Exclusionary pricing and consumers 
harm: the European Commission’s practice in the DSL market” in Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 2007, 249-250. 
191 Infra title 7.6.1 “Price competition” and title 8.3.3 “Taking into account sector-specific regulation 
in the European Union”. 
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1. The abuse may protect the welfare of competitors instead of the welfare 
of consumers;192 
2. The abuse may reduce undertakings’ willingness to invest;193 
3. Undertakings (that are not under an obligation to supply) may stop 
providing the upstream input to avoid liability;194 
4. Undertakings may increase retail prices to avoid liability;195 
5. Competition law is used to solve a regulatory issue.196 
                                                 
192 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 30; J. SIDAK, “Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust 
Liability” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2008, 294-295; G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, 
“Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European Competition Law Journal 2010, 265; 
N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: theory, practice, policy – part II” in European Competition Law Review 
2012, 1 and 6 G. HAY and K. MCMAHON, “The diverging approach to price squeezes in the United 
States and Europe” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2012, 296; M. HARKER, “EU 
competition law as a tool for dealing with regulatory failure: the broadband and margin squeeze 
cases” in Journal of Business Law 2013, 13; M. RAUBER and N. DELLAFIOR, “Case C-52/09, 
Konkurrentsverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, [2011] ECR I-527 - confirming an inappropriate 
assessment framework for margin squeeze” in European Competition Law Review 2013, 6-7. 
193 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 21; FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU 
Antitrust Law” in European Competition Law Journal 2010, 271-273; N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: 
theory, practice, policy – part I” in European Competition Law Review 2012, 2; G. HAY and K. 
MCMAHON, “The diverging approach to price squeezes in the United States and Europe” in Journal 
of Competition Law & Economics 2012, 261; M. COLANGELO, “The interface between competition rules 
and sector-specific regulation in the telecommunications sector: evidence from recent EU margin 
squeeze cases” in Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 2013, 236; M. HARKER, “EU 
competition law as a tool for dealing with regulatory failure: the broadband and margin squeeze 
cases” in Journal of Business Law 2013, 13; contra, EC, Memo, “Antitrust: Commission decision against 
Telefónica - frequently asked questions”, Brussels, 4 July 2007. 
194 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 23; W. CARLTON, “Should “price squeeze” be a recognized form of 
anticompetitive conduct?” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2008, 278; J. SIDAK, “Abolishing 
the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2008, 
282; G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European 
Competition Law Journal 2010, 265; G. HAY and K. MCMAHON, “The diverging approach to price 
squeezes in the United States and Europe” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2012, 286-287; 
M. HARKER, “EU competition law as a tool for dealing with regulatory failure: the broadband and 
margin squeeze cases” in Journal of Business Law 2013, 12. 
195 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 11; Opinion of AG MAZÁK 2 September 2010, case C-52/09, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:483, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 21; W. CARLTON, “Should “price 
squeeze” be a recognized form of anticompetitive conduct?” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 
2008, 278; G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in 
European Competition Law Journal 2010, 265. 
196 R. O’DONOGHUE, “Regulating the Regulated: Deutsche Telekom v. European Commission” in Global 
Competition Policy 2008, 16-17; G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, “Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU 
Antitrust Law” in European Competition Law Journal 2010, 264-265; A. HEIMLER, “Is margin squeeze 
an antitrust or a regulatory violation?” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2010, 888-889; G. 
EDWARDS, “Margin squeezes and the inefficient “equally efficient” operator” in European Competition 
Law Review 2011, 3; E. DE GHELLINCK and C. HUVENEERS, “Who is Right on Margin Squeeze: 
Competition Law or Sector Specific Regulation?” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 
2014, 97. 
MARGIN SQUEEZE 
Jura Falconis Jg. 53, 2016 - 2017, nr. 1   35 
While these critiques will not be systematically discussed in this paper, most of 
them are given elaborate treatment.197 
 
7.6. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
68. INTRODUCTION – Examining the margin squeeze jurisprudence of the 
ECJ and the US Supreme Court, two policy considerations stand out: price 
competition and legal certainty. On both topics, the courts hold a different view. 
As these different views underlie their differing legal approaches, they deserve to 
be discussed in more detail here. 
 
7.6.1. Price competition 
 
69. US: LOW RETAIL PRICES – The US Supreme Court and the ECJ 
approach price competition differently. The United States is known to have a 
relatively free market economy. This does seem to hold true when it comes to 
conceiving margin squeeze as a competition law infringement. As noted 
earlier,198 the US Supreme Court requires either a duty to deal or predatory 
pricing. One of its arguments is the following: 
 
“Recognizing a price-squeeze claim where the defendant’s retail price remains above cost 
would invite the precise harm we sought to avoid in Brooke Group: Firms might raise their 
retails prices or refrain from aggressive price competition to avoid potential antitrust 
liability.”199 
 
Under the title reserved for institutional concerns, the Court cites Trinko, stating 
that charging monopoly prices is an important element of the free market 
system.200 It concludes that the Sherman Act encourages price competition at 
the retail level, as long as the prices being charged are not predatory.201  
 
70. EU: CONSUMER CHOICE – The European Courts, on the contrary, 
seem to have less of a problem with an increase in retail prices, even in the 
absence of predatory pricing. In Deutsche Telekom, the ECJ stated: 
 
“However, the mere fact that the appellant would have to increase its retail prices for end-
user access services in order to avoid the margin squeeze of its competitors who are as efficient 
                                                 
197 For critique 1, see infra nr. 92 “MARKET ENTRY”; for critique 3, see supra title 7.4 “Constructive 
refusal to supply”; for critique 4, see infra title 7.6.1 “Price competition”; for critique 5, see infra nr. 
92 “MARKET ENTRY” and title 8.4.1 “Deutsche Telekom”. 
198 Supra nr. 51 “UNITED STATES”. 
199 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 11. 
200 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 14. 
201 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 15. 
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as the appellant cannot in any way, in itself, render irrelevant [the as-efficient-competitor 
test.]”202 
 
At the time of the Telefónica case, the retail product (broadband internet access) 
was up to 85% more expensive than the European average.203 But even then, 
the General Court considered an increase in retail prices an appropriate strategy 
to avoid margin squeeze.204 This can be explained by the ECJ’s position that 
“price competition does not constitute the only effective form of competition or 
that to which absolute priority must in all circumstances be given.”205 
 
More specifically, the ECJ sets out the following reasoning: a margin squeeze 
reduces the degree of competition on the market, thereby strengthening the 
dominant undertaking’s position on that market. That way, a margin squeeze 
has the effect that consumers suffer detriment as a result of the limitation of the 
choices available to them, consequently diminishing the prospect of a longer-
term reduction of retail prices as a result of competition exerted by competitors 
who are at least as efficient in that market.206 In other words, higher prices in the 
short term are justified by consumer choice and thus welfare in the long term. 
But is market entry not a task for the regulator?207 
 
71. US/EU DISAGREEMENT – Amici curiae also raised the consumer choice 
concern in the linkLine case. They contended that “price squeezes may impair 
nonprice competition and innovation in the downstream market by driving 
independent firms out of business.”208 The Supreme Court responded that there 
is no independent competitive harm beyond the harm that would result from a 
duty-to-deal violation or predatory pricing.209 As the Supreme Court does not 
identify any harm that is not covered by existing abuses, it does not endorse a 
new competition law abuse. It is tempting to conclude the ECJ is thinking more 
ahead. But the courts truly disagree on what is more valuable: a future greater 
number of competitors, or an immediate lower retail price. 
                                                 
202 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 181, confirming EC 21 May 2003, case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche 
Telekom, OJ L 263, 14.10.2003, 9, paras 163-175 and CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-477, para. 105 sq. 
203 GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0, para. 404. 
204 GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0, paras 336-
337, confirming EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ 
publication, para. 724. Note, however, that the Commission at least mentioned a decrease in 
wholesale prices in this case, see paras 334-335 and paras 653, 675, 724, respectively. 
205 ECJ 25 October 1977, case 26/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167, Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 
ECR 1977, 1875, para. 21; ECJ 9 September 2003, case C‑198/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:430, Consorzio 
Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF), ECR 2003, I-8055, para. 68 (quote). 
206 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 182. 
207 Infra nr. 92 “MARKET ENTRY”. 
208 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 15. 
209 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 15. 
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7.6.2. Legal certainty 
 
72. US: UNCERTAINTY FOR COURTS AND UNDERTAKINGS – The US 
Supreme Court and the ECJ also have opposed views on legal certainty, to which 
the US Supreme Court devotes a separate title of its linkLine judgment. After 
setting out that the predatory pricing and refusal to deal infringements suffice, 
legal certainty is in fact the US Supreme Court’s second argument against 
recognising margin squeeze as an independent abuse. The Court highlights the 
challenge of margin squeeze theory for the courts: 
 
“It is difficult enough for courts to identify and remedy an alleged anticompetitive practice 
at one level, such as predatory pricing in retail markets or a violation of the duty-to-deal 
doctrine at the wholesale level.”210 
 
But it also stresses the difficulty for undertakings: 
 
“Perhaps most troubling, firms that seek to avoid price-squeeze liability will have no safe 
harbour for their pricing practices. […] At least in the predatory pricing context, firms know 
they will not incur liability as long as their retails prices are above cost.”211 
 
The Court even takes account of lawyers, noting that antitrust rules “must be 
clear enough for lawyers to explain to their clients”.212  
 
73. EU: CERTAINTY FOR UNDERTAKINGS – The European courts seek to 
accommodate neither courts, nor lawyers (at least not explicitly). They do, 
however, take great care to ensure legal certainty for undertakings. The 
European courts have always defended the as-efficient-competitor test because 
it allows undertakings to assess the lawfulness of their conduct.213  
 
74. US/EU DISAGREEMENT – Interestingly, the American Antitrust 
Institute also prompted the US Supreme Court to judge the as-efficient-
competitor test (or, in its words, “transfer price test”) in an amicus curiae brief. The 
Supreme Court is apparently unwilling to go into it. It does not elaborate on the 
adequacy of this test, but only notes that “[w]hether or not that test is 
administrable, it lacks any grounding in our antitrust jurisprudence.”214 On the 
                                                 
210 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 13. 
211 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 13. 
212 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 13. 
213 CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-477, 
para. 192; ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 
2010, I-9555, para. 202; ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, 
ECR 2011, I-527, para. 44; GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, 
ECR 2012, 0, para. 192. 
214 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 14. 
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one hand, this is remarkable as the Supreme Court does highlight the substantive 
flaws of the “fair” or “adequate” margin standard (another test) in the same 
judgment.215 On the other hand, critique may be redundant if the rejection 
really is a necessary consequence of past choices. In any way, as with consumer 
welfare, the courts hold opposing views on legal certainty. In the end, the US 
Supreme Court rejects margin squeeze as an abuse because it cannot be tested, 
while the ECJ accepts the as-efficient-competitor standard as it allows margin 
squeeze to be tested. 
 
 
8. MARGIN SQUEEZE ASSESSMENT IN 
REGULATED MARKETS 
 
75. INTRODUCTION – Every margin squeeze case from Deutsche Telekom 
onwards originated from a regulated sector. This raises the question: how do 
competition authorities assess margin squeeze in regulated markets? This final 
chapter starts with an overview of the similarities and differences between 
competition law and sector-specific regulation, and continues with an 
introduction on how conflicts between EU competition law and EU or national 
regulation are resolved. The main part of this chapter then looks at the way in 
which the Commission and the European courts assess margin squeeze in 
regulated markets. 
 
8.1. NATURE OF COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC 
REGULATION 
 
76. GOAL – Competition law and sector-specific regulation exhibit both 
similarities and differences.216 Competition law and sector-specific regulation 
share their main goal: to realise effective competition, and thus consumer welfare. 
Regulation may have a broader objective, such as liberalisation, although 
competition law is also used to that end.  
 
77. METHOD – However, sector-specific regulation and competition law 
use a different method to achieve this similar goal. This is demonstrated by their 
Latin denominations “ex ante” and “ex post”, respectively. Sector-specific 
regulation is by nature ex ante; it tries to prevent an anti-competitive environment, 
or even aims at increasing the level of competition. Competition law operates ex 
post; it punishes anti-competitive behaviour to maintain the level of competition.  
 
78. BLURRED LINES – You could say sector-specific regulation promotes 
competition while competition law ensures it. But as with the ends, the lines 
between the different means have blurred over time. Competition law has turned 
                                                 
215 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 13-14. 
216 Disclaimer: this account of those similarities and differences will necessarily simplify things. 
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into ‘regulatory antitrust’ and sector-specific regulation operates as ‘pre-emptive 
competition law’.217 Concentration control, for example, falls between these 
categories, as the name ‘ex ante competition law’ indicates. 
 
79. DIFFERENT CONTRASTS – DE STREELE elaborates on the classic 
paradigm. He argues that the two differences between antitrust and sector 
regulations are that 
1. “sector regulation mainly deals with unsatisfactory market structures 
whereas competition law deals with unsatisfactory firms’ behaviours, 
and 
2. the burden of proof for sector regulation to intervene on the selected 
markets is lower than antitrust law.”218 
 
The International Competition Network presents another contrast along similar 
lines.219 It reports that regulation typically focuses only on the main aspects of 
business conduct, providing a framework that regulated undertakings need to 
follow. Competition law prohibitions on agreements and abuses are expressed 
in more general terms. The Network concludes that competition law plays a 
residual role, 220  catching infringements that fall through the cracks of the 
regulatory framework. 
 
80. WHEN TO REGULATE? – While competition law applies to every sector, 
sector-specific regulation does not. A specific sector is only regulated when 
competition law remedies would not suffice to solve the competition problems.221 
In this sense, sector-specific regulation is subsidiary, at least in its creation. In the 
telecommunications sector, the Commission has identified three cumulative 
criteria that make a sector susceptible to ex ante regulation:222 
1. The market has high and non-transitory barriers to entry; 
2. The market does not tend towards effective competition within a 
relevant time horizon; 
                                                 
217 A. DE STREELE, “The Relationship between Competition Law and Sector Specific Regulation: 
The case of electronic communications” in Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique 2008, para. 1. 
218 A. DE STREELE, “The Relationship between Competition Law and Sector Specific Regulation: 
The case of electronic communications” in Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique 2008, para. 43. 
219  International Competition Network, Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors Working 
Group, Report to the Third ICN Annual Conference, 2004, 3. 
220  International Competition Network, Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors Working 
Group, Report to the Third ICN Annual Conference, 2004, 3. 
221 A fact of which we are reminded in Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (Framework Directive), OJ L 108, 24.04.2002, 33-50, recital 27. 
222 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework 
Directive), OJ L 108, 24.04.2002, 33-50, recital 27; interpreted by Commission Recommendation 
2014/710/EU of 9 October 2014 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, OJ L 295, 11.10.2014, 79-84, paras 11-16. 
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3. The application of competition law alone would not adequately address 
the market failure(s) concerned. 
Applying this test, the Commission listed four specific markets in 2014,223 down 
from eighteen in 2003.224 National regulatory authorities are to act upon this 
recommendation. 
 
8.2. INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION 
 
81. INTRODUCTION – In the European Union, sectors can be regulated 
both at the EU and the national level. EU competition law takes precedence 
over both EU and national regulation. In practice, the difference between 
national and EU regulation is not always as clear-cut, as the former often derives 
from the latter.225 
 
82. HORIZONTAL RELATIONSHIP – The core provisions of EU competition 
law are enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and 
accordingly enjoy the status of primary law. The EU adopts sector-specific 
regulation in regulations and directives, which constitute secondary law. That is 
why EU competition law has priority over EU regulation. EU regulatory 
measures can only deviate from EU competition law when this is provided for 
by primary law itself (e.g. Art. 42 TFEU, that allows exemption for agriculture). 
However, the European courts avoid conflict with their so-called ‘co-existence 
doctrine’, according to which EU competition law and EU regulation (and the 
national regulation deriving from it) apply side-by-side and undertakings must 
comply with both simultaneously.226 
 
                                                 
223 Annex to Commission Recommendation 2014/710/EU of 9 October 2014 on relevant product 
and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 295, 
11.10.2014, 79-84. 
224  Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC of 11 February 2003 on relevant 
product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante 
regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services, 
OJ L 114, 08.05.2003, 45-49. 
225 See e.g. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive), OJ L 108, 24.04.2002, 33-50, that is in turn part of the ‘Telecoms Package’ 
that has to be implemented by Member States. For more information, see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al24216a.  
226 ECJ 6 December 2012, case C-457/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:770, AstraZeneca, ECR 2012, 0, para. 
154; A. ARENA, “The relationship between antitrust and regulation in the US and the EU: can legal 
tradition account for the differences?” in Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 2014, 5; 
see also infra title 8.3.1 “Complementarity in the European Union”. 
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83. VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP – According to the principle of primacy of 
EU law, EU law takes precedence over national law. 227  Therefore, EU 
competition law has priority over national regulation. In its Arduino judgment, 
the ECJ stated that Art. 101 and 102 TFEU, read in conjunction with Art. 4(3) 
TEU, “require Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures, 
even of a legislative or regulatory nature, which may render ineffective the 
competition rules applicable to undertakings.” 228  But what is the faith of 
undertakings if Member States do introduce measures that conflict with the EU 
competition rules? That is where the ‘state compulsion defence’ comes in. EU 
competition law does not apply “[i]f anti-competitive conduct is required of 
undertakings by national legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework 
which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part”.229 
However, the burden of proof for this defence is high: an undertaking must show 
that the regulatory scheme “eliminated any margin of autonomy on the part of 
those undertakings”.230 
 
8.3. MARGIN SQUEEZE ASSESSMENT IN REGULATED MARKETS 
 
84. INTRODUCTION – Under EU law, sector-specific regulation and 
competition law are complementary. It is only under very strict conditions that 
the presence of sector-specific regulation excludes the possibility of a margin 
squeeze. Whether the ECJ’s margin squeeze test is suitable in regulated markets 
is a point of on-going debate. Under US law, by contrast, sector-specific 
regulation more easily makes competition law inapplicable to an alleged margin 
squeeze.  As (almost) always, there are arguments pro and contra each approach. 
 
8.3.1. Complementarity in the European Union 
 
85. CONCURRENT APPLICATION – There is no doubt that sector-specific 
regulation and competition law are complementary in the European Union. In 
its Access Notice, the Commission writes that competition law and sector-
specific regulation form a coherent regulatory framework; they are concurrently 
                                                 
227 ECJ 15 July 1964, case 6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., ECR 1964, 585; 
Intergovernmental Conference, Declaration (no. 17) concerning primacy, attached to the Treaty of 
Lisbon, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, 231-271. 
228 ECJ 19 February 2002, case-35/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:97, Arduino, ECR 2002, I-1529, para. 34 
and the case-law cited there; subsequently confirmed in (amongst others) ECJ 5 December 2006, 
joined cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:758, Meloni, ECR 2006, I-11421, with 
reference to ECJ 17 February 2005, case C‑250/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:96, Mauri, ECR 2005, I-1267, 
para. 29 and the case-law cited there. 
229  ECJ 16 December 1975, joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114-73, 
ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, Suiker Unie, ECR 1975, 1663, paras 65-72; ECJ 11 November 1997, joined 
cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P, ECLI:EU:C:1997:531, Ladbroke Racing, ECR 1997, I-6265, paras 
33 and 34, and the case-law cited there. 
230 CFI 18 September 1996, case T-387/94, ECLI:EU:T:1996:120, Asia Motor France, ECR 1996, II-
961, para. 65. 
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applicable and mutually reinforcing.231 In Deutsche Telekom, the ECJ held that 
“the competition rules laid down by the [TFEU] supplement in that regard, by 
an ex post review, the legislative framework adopted by the Union legislature for 
ex ante regulation”. 232  Expressing his opinion in Deutsche Telekom, Advocate 
General MAZÁK wrote that “the regulatory framework in question completes 
competition law provisions and the two sets of rules should be considered to be 
complementary.”233 Acknowledging that ex ante regulation is by nature more 
elaborate than competition law rules, MAZÁK confirms that the latter “form a 
set of minimum criteria”.234 
 
86. STATE COMPULSION DEFENCE – But sector-specific regulation and 
competition law must not always be applied concurrently. As noted above, 
undertakings can rely on the state compulsion defence, albeit under strict 
conditions. The ECJ confirmed this defence in connection with margin squeeze: 
 
“[I]t is only if anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation, 
or if the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive 
activity on their part, that Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] do not apply. [I]f a national 
law merely encourages or makes it easier for undertakings to engage in autonomous anti-
competitive conduct, those undertakings remain subject to Articles Articles [101 and 102 
TFEU].”235 
 
87. 1) SCOPE – In other words, “Article 102 TFEU applies only to anti-
competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their own initiative.”236 The 
ECJ captures all of this with the word ‘scope’. As long as an undertaking has 
scope to change its conduct, the restriction of competition is attributable to it. 
The ECJ concedes that the possibility to exclude anti-competitive conduct from 
the scope of competition law in this way has only been accepted to a limited 
extent.237  
 
88. 2) FAULT – Once it has been established the undertaking has scope to 
change its conduct, competition law is applicable. The next step is then to 
                                                 
231 Commission Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, OJ C 265, 22.08.1998, 2-28, paras 57-58. 
232 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 92. 
233 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 22 April 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:212, Deutsche Telekom, 
ECR 2010, I-9555, para. 19. 
234 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 22 April 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:212, Deutsche Telekom, 
ECR 2010, I-9555, para. 16. 
235 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, paras 80 and 82, with reference to ECJ 11 November 1997, joined cases C-359/95 P and C-
379/95 P, ECLI:EU:C:1997:531, Ladbroke Racing, ECR 1997, I-6265, paras 33 and 34, and the case-
law cited there. 
236 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
49; GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0, para. 328. 
237 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 81. 
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consider whether there was ‘fault’ on its part by failing to use that scope to 
remedy the abuse. This fault is taken into account to determine whether the 
conduct constitutes an infringement and to set the fine.238 This fault, however, 
can be either committing margin squeeze, or omitting to prevent it.239 In the 
latter case, ‘scope’ and ‘fault’ are barely distinguishable. 
 
89. EXAMPLES – Deutsche Telekom illustrates well how difficult it is to escape 
the applicability of competition law. The ECJ still found Deutsche Telekom had 
scope to avoid margin squeeze, even though national sector-specific regulation 
 imposed a duty to deal; 
 strictly set wholesale prices; and 
 subjected retail prices to a steadily decreasing price cap over the time 
period concerned, with any retail price changes requiring permission 
of the regulator.240 
There seems to be something wrong when an abuse is measured by the spread 
between two prices, but the undertaking can only alter one price (and even this 
requires permission). Prices were also regulated in Telefónica, although slightly 
less so than in Deutsche Telekom. While sector-specific regulation imposed a duty 
to deal, 241  it did not regulate the retail prices. 242  Neither did sector-specific 
regulation determine the price of the national wholesale product, but it did impose 
a maximum price for the regional wholesale product (Telefónica had to apply for 
reductions).243 
 
90. CRITIQUE – It is clear that ‘scope to reduce or end a margin squeeze’ is 
interpreted very broadly. The Deutsche Telekom case in particular has drawn a lot 
of criticism. DUNNE criticises the ECJ for setting “the threshold for autonomous 
conduct at a nonsensically low level.”244 He contends that the ECJ should have 
considered the legality of Deutsche Telekom’s retail prices in isolation, since 
Deutsche Telekom could only alter its retail prices, while an anti-competitive 
spread implies the need for at least two reference points.245  
                                                 
238 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 89. 
239 This is implicit in ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche 
Telekom, ECR 2010, I-9555, and explicit in ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 53. 
240 CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-477, 
paras 1-24. 
241 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
paras 303 and 661. 
242 GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0, paras 336-
337 (only one subsidiary had to apply for administrative authorisation, and only during a part of the 
infringement period). 
243 GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0, paras 331-
335. 
244 N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: theory, practice, policy – part II” in European Competition Law Review 
2012, 5. 
245 N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: theory, practice, policy – part II” in European Competition Law Review 
2012, 5. 
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A similar critique has been voiced earlier by MOORE. Commenting on the 
Deutsche Telekom case, she says that in regulated markets, “it is a pretence to 
involve the wholesale prices in the test at all.”246 When an undertaking has no 
control over the wholesale prices it charges, the retail prices as such must be 
abusive. These retail prices should only be considered abusive if they meet the 
established requirements for predatory pricing. This means it must be shown 
that the prices over which the undertaking has discretion are set at a profit-losing 
level in order to eliminate the competition.247 
 
8.3.2. Immunity in the United States 
 
91. REGULATORY IMMUNITY – Under US law, by contrast, courts more 
easily accept the state compulsion defence (or ‘regulatory immunity’).248 This 
holds particularly true in margin squeeze cases. In the linkLine case, Justice 
BREYER put it as follows:  
“When a regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm, the costs of 
antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the benefits.”249 
 
Almost the exact same wording was used in the earlier Trinko case.250 But Justice 
BREYER referred to Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co. as the precedent.251 In 
this case, the court concluded that price regulation will, in most cases, prevent a 
price squeeze from constituting an ‘exclusionary practice’ of the sort that 
Sherman Act section 2 forbids.252 The reasons for this position are twofold: 
 
“Effective price regulation at both the first and second industry levels makes it unlikely that 
requesting such rates will ordinarily create a serious risk of significant anticompetitive harm. 
At the same time, regulatory circumstances create a significant risk that a court’s efforts to 
stop such price requests will bring about the very harms – diminished efficiency, higher 
prices – that the antitrust laws seek to prevent.”253 
 
                                                 
246 M. MOORE, “Deutsche Telekom and the margin squeeze fallacy” in European Competition Law 
Journal 2008, 5. 
247 M. MOORE, “Deutsche Telekom and the margin squeeze fallacy” in European Competition Law 
Journal 2008, 5. 
248 The landmark case in this respect is Supreme Court of the United States 18 June 2007, docket 
no. 05-1157, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, fka Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, et al. V. Billing et al. 
249 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc. – J. BREYER, concurring in judgment, 2. 
250 “When there exists a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm, 
the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small”, see 
Supreme Court of the United States 13 January 2004, docket no. 02–682, Verizon Communications Inc. 
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 2 and 12. 
251 United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit) 21 September 1990, docket no. 89-1872, Town of 
Concord v. Boston Edison Co. This reference may be explained by the fact that Justice BREYER was Chief 
Justice of that court at the time. 
252 United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit) 21 September 1990, docket no. 89-1872, Town of 
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., para. 5. 
253 United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit) 21 September 1990, docket no. 89-1872, Town of 
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., para. 5. 
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In other words, there is not likely any harm for courts to prevent, but there may 
be harm for them to cause (note that antitrust enforcement is court-based in the 
US). A lot of competition authorities and courts do not see it this way, as the 
International Competition Network reports that this exemption approach has 
been progressively abandoned in most countries.254 
 
8.3.3. Taking into account sector-specific regulation in the European Union 
 
92. MARKET ENTRY – The EU margin squeeze assessment is not insensitive 
to the presence of sector-specific regulation either. In fact, the Commission and 
the European Courts take account of regulatory objectives, most notably the 
market entry (and growth) of competitors. The author identified three instances 
where this objective is explicitly or implicitly (but clearly) pursued. 
 
1. Positive margin squeeze theory. As discussed earlier,255 an undertaking may commit 
a margin squeeze even when it leaves positive margins for its competitors. The 
ECJ explains that even reduced profitability of those competitors would mean 
“a competitive disadvantage on that market which is such as to prevent or 
restrict their access to it or the growth of their activities on it.”256 In other words, 
promoting market entry and growth is the rationale of the ECJ’s positive margin 
squeeze theory. 
 
2. Individual assessment. As also discussed earlier,257 the Commission may choose 
to conduct a margin squeeze assessment for every individual products rather 
than for product bundles. Arguably, this disregards the economic reality, but it 
certainly makes it easier for the Commission to find a margin squeeze. The 
explicit aim of this choice is to facilitate market entry by competitors.258 
 
3. Disregarding certain costs. The Commission and the European courts do not 
consider unavoidable costs borne by entrants – but not by the vertically integrated 
undertaking – to check whether these entrants are as efficient.259 The result is 
that a competitor will more easily be regarded as efficient as the vertically 
integrated undertaking. This means the threshold to establish a margin squeeze 
is lower. In Deutsche Telekom, for example, discontinuance charges were not taken 
                                                 
254  International Competition Network, Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors Working 
Group, Report to the Third ICN Annual Conference, 2004, 3. 
255 Supra nr. 31 “ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECT”. 
256 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
70. 
257 Supra nr. 44 “PRODUCT BUNDLES”. 
258  EC 21 May 2003, case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263, 
14.10.2003, 9, para. 127. 
259 G. EDWARDS, “Margin squeezes and the inefficient “equally efficient” operator” in European 
Competition Law Review 2011, 3 (the author does not agree with the Commission as to what constitute 
unavoidable costs versus what are actually inefficiencies); E. DE GHELLINCK and C. HUVENEERS, 
“Who is Right on Margin Squeeze: Competition Law or Sector Specific Regulation?” in Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 2014, 97. 
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into account.260 The Commission did the same in Telefónica, explicitly confirming 
that this would allow entrants to climb the ladder of investment.261  
 
In the same sense, and as discussed earlier,262 the ECJ allows deviation from the 
as-efficient-competitor test when the infrastructure cost of the dominant 
undertaking has already been written off. In that case, the efficiency of a 
competing undertaking must not be measured against the dominant undertaking, 
but can be measured against other competitors.263 This also lowers the threshold 
to establish a margin squeeze.  
 
Mechanism. These three strategies to facilitate market entry use a similar 
mechanism. Each of them makes it easier for the Commission to conclude that 
an undertaking is executing a margin squeeze. As the threshold to establish a 
margin squeeze is lower, undertakings have to act accordingly; they have to 
avoid reaching the threshold, or have to remedy transgressing it. The way to do 
this is by either reducing wholesale prices, or increasing retail prices. Whichever 
way the undertaking chooses (if regulation leaves it a choice), market entry or 
growth of competitors will be facilitated. When it comes to increasing retail 
prices, the ECJ has explicitly confirmed that these higher prices (in the short 
term) are justified by the greater number of competitors, i.e. market entry (in the 
long term).264 But the same goes for both increasing retail prices and decreasing 
wholesale prices: allowing slightly less efficient entry in the short-term will lead 
to long-term benefits for end-customers that more than compensate. However, 
it is often remarked that judgments of this nature fit more comfortably within 
the realm of ex ante regulatory policy, rather than of ex post competition law.265 
                                                 
260 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 215 (where the ECJ does not accept Deutsche Telekom’s objection to this practice). 
261 EC 4 April 2007, case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica, no integral OJ publication, 
para. 392. 
262 Supra nr. 43 “COSTS AND PRICES COMPETITORS”. 
263 ECJ 17 February 2011, case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, TeliaSonera, ECR 2011, I-527, para. 
46; GC 29 March 2012, case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, Telefónica, ECR 2012, 0, para. 193. 
264 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 182. 
265  D. GERADIN and R. O’DONOGHUE, “The concurrent application of competition law and 
regulation: the cases of margin squeeze abuses in the telecommunications sector” in Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 2005, 395; R. O’DONOGHUE, “Regulating the Regulated: Deutsche 
Telekom v. European Commission” in Global Competition Policy 2008, 16-17; G. FAELLA and R. PARDOLESI, 
“Squeezing Price Squeeze under EU Antitrust Law” in European Competition Law Journal 2010, 264-
265; G. EDWARDS, “Margin squeezes and the inefficient “equally efficient” operator” in European 
Competition Law Review 2011, 3; A. HEIMLER, “Is margin squeeze an antitrust or a regulatory 
violation?” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2010, 888-889; G. HAY and K. MCMAHON, 
“The diverging approach to price squeezes in the United States and Europe” in Journal of Competition 
Law & Economics 2012, 296; M. HARKER, “EU competition law as a tool for dealing with regulatory 
failure: the broadband and margin squeeze cases” in Journal of Business Law 2013, 6; E. DE 
GHELLINCK and C. HUVENEERS, “Who is Right on Margin Squeeze: Competition Law or Sector 
Specific Regulation?” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2014, 97; C. BERGQVIST and 
J. TOWNSEND, “Enforcing Margin Squeeze Ex Post Across Converging Telecommunications 
Markets”, Konkurrensverkets Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2015:2, 15 and 19-20; D. PETZOLD, 
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93. FINES – Lastly, the Commission and the European courts take account 
of sector-specific regulation when setting fines. In Deutsche Telekom, the 
Commission considered it a mitigating circumstance that the retail and 
wholesale charges in question were subject to sector-specific regulation at the 
national level. It reduced the basic amount of the fine by 10%, which was later 
confirmed by the General Court and the ECJ.266  
 
The ECJ reiterated that the undertaking’s small contribution to the infringement 
in the light of the regulation of its charges do not alter the gravity of the 
infringement. 267  This is explained by the fact that “the role played by the 
undertaking concerned in the infringement is, in principle, not a mandatory 
factor but just one of a number of other factors to be taken into account in 
assessing the gravity of the infringement.”268 The national legal framework is 
only a mitigating factor once the level of the penalty is set.269 In conclusion, the 
Commission and the European courts do not conceive a regulatory framework 
as an objective justification, but only as a factor for fine mitigation. This leaves 
the door open for follow-on actions, and recidivism becomes a possible 
aggravating factor in future offences.270 
 
8.3.4. Evaluation of the state compulsion defence in the European Union 
 
94. ARGUMENTS PRO – Firstly, the regulatory immunity approach takes 
pressure off competition authorities.271 The division of work is simple: when an 
undertaking is regulated, the regulator deals with issues of competition; when it 
is not regulated, the competition authority must ensure effective competition. 
                                                 
“It Is All Predatory Pricing: Margin Squeeze Abuse and the Concept of Opportunity Costs in EU 
Competition Law” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2015, 5. 
266  EC 21 May 2003, case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263, 
14.10.2003, 9, para. 212; CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, 
ECR 2008, II-477, para. 313; ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, 
Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-9555, para. 279. 
267 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 277. 
268 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
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9555, para. 278. 
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This way, the (often burdened) competition authorities do not end up doing or 
repeating the work of regulators. 
 
The US Supreme Court promotes a division of work, writing that in a regulated 
sector “the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the 
benefits.”272 Justice BREYER then argues the courts are the wrong forum for at 
least part of the respondent’s claim. He states they “could have gone to the 
regulators and asked for petitioners’ wholesale prices to be lowered in light of 
the alleged price squeeze.”273 In other words, the regulatory authority should be 
the first (and only) forum. 
The Commission voices a similar concern: 
“[T]he Commission will aim to avoid unnecessary duplication of procedures, in particular 
competition procedures and national/Community regulatory procedures[.]”274 
 
The Commission specifies its commitment, writing that when “there are related 
actions before a relevant national or European authority or court, the 
Directorate-General for Competition will generally not initially pursue any 
investigation” into a possible competition law infringement.275 It does seem that 
they are more willing to stick to this separation of work in the US than in the 
EU.  
 
Secondly, the regulatory immunity approach also benefits undertakings by 
simplifying compliance. Satisfying both a regulatory and a competition regime 
is demanding and can create serious legal uncertainty. Overburdening 
undertakings may suffocate their business. That is not to say financial statements 
should take precedence over consumer welfare. That is simply to question 
whether there is no way to safeguard the latter without affecting the former. 
 
Other noteworthy arguments in favour of the state compulsion defence are the 
specialisation of regulatory authorities and the increased risk of false positives 
when two authorities assess a conduct. 276 
 
                                                 
272 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc. – J. BREYER, concurring in judgment, 2. 
273 Supreme Court of the United States 25 February 2009, docket no. 07-512, Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc. – J. BREYER, concurring in judgment, 3. 
274 Commission Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, OJ C 265, 22.08.1998, 2-28, para. 150. 
275 Commission Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, OJ C 265, 22.08.1998, 2-28, para. 28. 
276 D. GERADIN, “Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche Telekom?” 
in Common Market Law Review 2004, 1549-1550; G. HAY and K. MCMAHON, “The diverging 
approach to price squeezes in the United States and Europe” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 
2012, 274 and 261, respectively; M. COLANGELO, “The interface between competition rules and 
sector-specific regulation in the telecommunications sector: evidence from recent EU margin 
squeeze cases” in Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 2013, 231. 
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95. ARGUMENTS CONTRA – Where the regulatory regime cannot remedy 
the margin squeeze, however, excluding the application of competition law to 
remedy the market problem may create a lacuna in the legal framework. 
Insufficient legal power, tight budgets or regulatory capture could prevent the 
regulatory agency from doing an effective job. As a ‘second best’ solution to 
safeguard consumer welfare (until the regulatory situation has been repaired), 
competition law seems useful, or even necessary. 277  Maybe this is also the 
interaction Advocate-General MAZÁK envisioned when he called competition 
law “a set of minimum criteria”.278 But repairing the regulatory situation should 
still be the priority. In that sense, The International Competition Network notes 
that when regulation is not fully effective the best alternative is to promote its 
amendment so as to improve it.279 
 
It could also be argued that regulators and competition authorities have different 
methods that lead to different outcomes, which is why both the regulator and 
the competition authority should assess a conduct. But this concern could be 
alleviated by obliging the regulator to also apply competition law.280 Or would 
that simply duplicate the work of the regulator instead of achieving an efficient 
division of work? 
 
96. CONCLUSION – As it usually goes with extremes, neither of them is 
desirable. Exempting regulated sectors from competition law is problematic 
when the regulation is not doing its job. But fully subjecting undertakings to both 
sector-specific regulation and competition law may be too much of a burden. To 
combine or not to combine, that is the question. It is clear that competition law 
should step in where regulation is, for any reason, ineffective. Improving the 
                                                 
277 D. GERADIN, “Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche Telekom?” 
in Common Market Law Review 2004, 1550; D. GERADIN and R. O’DONOGHUE, “The concurrent 
application of competition law and regulation: the cases of margin squeeze abuses in the 
telecommunications sector” in Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2005, 419; T.T. NGUYEN, 
“Price squeezing: Linkline in the United States – no link to the European Union” in International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2010, 10; N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: theory, 
practice, policy – part II” in European Competition Law Review 2012, 3; M. HARKER, “EU competition 
law as a tool for dealing with regulatory failure: the broadband and margin squeeze cases” in Journal 
of Business Law 2013, 3 and 12. 
278 Opinion of AG MAZÁK 22 April 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:212, Deutsche Telekom, 
ECR 2010, I-9555, para. 16. 
279  International Competition Network, Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors Working 
Group, Report to the Third ICN Annual Conference, 2004, 4. 
280 A model for this arrangement can be found in Supreme Court of the United States 13 January 
2004, docket no. 02–682, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP; J.B. MEISEL, 
“Case comment – is Trinko a useful model for the European Union?” in European Competition Law 
Review 2013, 218-222; see also M. COLANGELO, “The interface between competition rules and 
sector-specific regulation in the telecommunications sector: evidence from recent EU margin 
squeeze cases” in Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 2013, 231 and 235; a similar solution 
is suggested by N. PETIT, “The Proliferation of National Regulatory Authorities alongside 
Competition Authorities: A Source of Jurisdictional Confusion” in The Global Competition Law Centre 
Working Papers Series 2004, 30. 
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regulatory framework is the preferable strategy, but may not be realistic in the 
short-term. In the meantime, competition law can play a valuable role. 
 
97. COMPROMISE – But should competition law step in every time 
regulation fails? NITSCHE and WIETHAUS formulate two additional criteria to 
decide whether it is useful to complement ex ante with ex post intervention:281 
1. “Ex post competition intervention in regulated industries appears more 
useful if it enforces competition on and end to end basis.” 
2. “Ex post competition intervention in regulated industries appears more 
useful if it relates to goods or services that are not tightly intertwined 
with other regulated goods or services.” 
The authors give the example of an airport. 282  In such an industry with a 
number of essential facilities, competition law would be unable to remove a 
competitive bottleneck on and end-to-end basis (criterion 1). Moreover, 
competition law would create inefficiencies because it does not take account of 
the relation between different regulated goods and services (criterion 2). They 
conclude that such a situation should only be subject to sector-specific 
regulation.283 There is no place for such criteria in the courtroom, but it might 
be interesting if the Commission took account of them when determining its 
enforcement priorities. 
 
Another solution would be to organise a temporal division of work between the 
Commission and the regulator.284 When the Commission detects a competition 
problem, it could give the national regulator a specified amount of time to 
resolve it. If the regulator fails to do so in time, the Commission can step in to 
deal with the issue. This is not a revolutionary idea, as the Commission has 
chosen this course of action before.285 
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Scope for Intervention” in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2012, 411-412. 
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8.4. DIVERGING JUDGMENTS BY DIFFERENT AUTHORITIES 
 
98. INTRODUCTION – Finally, we consider the interactions between the 
European Commission and the national regulatory authorities (and national 
courts). This interaction has been especially problematic in two cases: Deutsche 
Telekom and Telefónica.286 A number of issues will be identified, the most salient 
one being diverging judgments from different authorities. The follow-up 
question whether these national authorities were at fault merits special 
consideration. 
 
8.4.1. Deutsche Telekom 
 
99. ISSUES – According to some, the real issue in Deutsche Telekom287 was 
regulatory failure, in more than one way. Firstly, there was a lack of tariff 
rebalancing by Germany’s telecommunications regulator RegTP. Secondly, 
RegTP failed to adequately supervise Deutsche Telekom’s wholesale prices. 
Thirdly, RegTP authorised Deutsche Telekom’s behaviour on numerous 
occasions. Each of these failures could have justified infringement proceedings 
against Germany. 
 
100. 1) LACK OF TARIFF REBALANCING – Firstly, Germany failed to comply 
with its obligation to rebalance tariffs. This contention requires some 
background: historically, former state monopoly telecom providers (such as 
Deutsche Telekom) have made losses on certain services, subsidizing those with 
profits from other services. In 1990, the Commission adopted a directive to 
achieve effective competition in the telecom market, 288 and it amended this 
directive in 1996.289 This amended directive required Member States to achieve 
a full rebalancing of the tariffs by January 1st 1998.290 Tariff rebalancing means 
aligning tariffs with real costs. Specifically, that operation had to take the form 
of a reduction in the charges for regional and international calls and an increase 
in connection charges, the monthly rental and local call rates.291 This would put 
                                                 
286 There was also a diverging national court decision in Deutsche Bahn (see T. STEINVORTH, “Deutsche 
Bahn: Commitments End Margin Squeeze Investigation” in Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 2014, 628), but too little information is available to draw meaningful conclusions. 
287  EC 21 May 2003, case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263, 
14.10.2003, 9; CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 
2008, II-477; ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 
2010, I-9555. 
288  Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services, OJ L 192, 24.07.1990, 10-16. 
289 Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with 
regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, OJ L 074, 
22.03.1996, 13-24. 
290 Art. 4c Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC 
with regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, OJ L 074, 
22.03.1996, 13-24, as interpreted in ECJ 7 January 2004, case 500/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:8, 
Commission v. Spain, ECR 2004, I-583, para. 32. 
291 Opinion of AG LÉGER 10 July 2003, case 500/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:405, Commission v. Spain, 
ECR 2004, I-583, para. 7. 
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an end to the common practice where telecom operators subsidised the losses on 
certain services with the profit of others (‘cross-subsidisation’). 
 
Germany (through its regulator RegTP) did not achieve tariff rebalancing by 
January 1st 1998. Not incidentally, the duration of Deutsche Telekom’s margin 
squeeze starts on January 1st 1998 (and ends on December 31st 2001).292 If the 
Commission wanted to fix the root of the problem, it would have to bring 
infringement proceedings against Germany for its failure to fulfil an obligation 
under the Treaties (Art. 258 TFEU). The European courts admitted as much: 
 
“While it is not inconceivable that the German authorities also infringed Community law 
[…] by opting for a gradual rebalancing of connection and call charges, such a failure to 
act, if it were to be established, would not remove the scope which the applicant had to 
reduce the margin squeeze.”293 
 
O’DONOGHUE strongly criticises the Commission’s course of action, writing “it 
seems not only unfair, but also as a matter of administrative law wrong, for 
Deutsche Telekom to be the only firm penalised as a result of Germany’s and 
the Commission’s failures to take action.”294 HARKER also points out how this 
approach by the Commission produces uncertainty and unfairness for regulated 
undertakings.295 
 
101. 2) POOR SUPERVISION OF WHOLESALE PRICES – Secondly, RegTP has 
drawn criticism for its role as supervisor of the wholesale prices. As noted,296 
RegTP strictly determined Deutsche Telekom’s wholesale prices297 (while only 
setting maximum retail prices)298. As also noted,299 the European courts decided 
that Deutsche Telekom had sufficient scope to avoid a margin squeeze as it could 
increase its retail prices, provided the price cap was respected. 300  (Observe, 
however, that this was only possible because Deutsche Telekom previously 
lowered its retail prices under the price cap set by RegTP.)301 
                                                 
292 See CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-
477, para. 306. 
293 CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-477, 
para. 265; ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 
2010, I-9555, para. 14. 
294 R. O’DONOGHUE, “Regulating the Regulated: Deutsche Telekom v. European Commission” in Global 
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paras 5-9. 
298 CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-477, 
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300 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2010, I-
9555, para. 181. 
301 CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-477, 
paras 100-105. 
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It could be argued, as some commentators do, that it would have made more 
sense for the European courts to focus on the wholesale prices that were simply 
set too high.302 Again, this would involve bringing proceedings against Germany. 
In this regard, DUNNE remarks that “[t]he rational solution would have been to 
fix the broken regulation and reduce wholesale prices to the competitive level. 
Unfortunately, the Commission chose to pursue an abuse of dominance case 
against Deutsche Telekom rather than bringing infringement proceedings 
against Germany under Article 258 TFEU”. 303  In the same sense, 
O’DONOGHUE writes that “any margin squeeze created as a result of the 
wholesale charges was a direct result of State action and could not have been 
attributed to DT.”304 Twice, it seems that the real problem was inadequate 
regulation, but the Commission chose the competition law solution, and the 
European courts confirmed this choice.305 
 
102. 3) DIVERGING JUDGMENTS – Thirdly, and perhaps most interestingly, 
RegTP examined the issue of margin squeeze in at least five separate 
decisions. 306  Each time, RegTP found a negative spread between Deutsche 
Telekom’s wholesale and retails prices.307 However, RegTP consistently took the 
view that other operators should be able to offer their end-users competitive 
prices by resorting to cross-subsidised charges for access services and call 
charges.308 In other words, rivals could remain competitive. Translated to the 
EU’s margin squeeze language: Deutsche Telekom failed the as-efficient-
competitor test (negative spread), but there was no (sufficient) anti-competitive 
effect. As both the regulator and the Commission applied the as-efficient-
competitor test, HAY and MCMAHON argue that “if reasonable minds can differ 
on the determination of the economic issues, there should be greater deference 
to the regulator, who has sector-specific knowledge”.309 
 
The CFI had a layered response to this situation. Firstly, it stated that “RegTP 
did not consider the compatibility of the charges in question with Article [102 
                                                 
302 R. O’DONOGHUE, “Regulating the Regulated: Deutsche Telekom v. European Commission” in Global 
Competition Policy 2008, 8; N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: from broken regulation to legal uncertainty” 
in Cambridge Law Journal 2011, 36-37. 
303 N. DUNNE, “Margin squeeze: from broken regulation to legal uncertainty” in Cambridge Law 
Journal 2011, 36-37. 
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TFEU] or, at any rate, that it applied Article [102 TFEU] incorrectly.”310 In any 
event, the CFI held that “[t]he Commission cannot be bound by a decision taken 
by a national body pursuant to Article [102 TFEU].”311 Indeed, the Commission 
remains free to decide “even where an agreement or practice has already been 
the subject of a decision by a national court and the decision contemplated by 
the Commission conflicts with that national court's decision.”312 Thirdly, the 
CFI reiterated that it all comes down to Deutsche Telekom having scope to 
reduce or end the margin squeeze.313 On a final note, the CFI remarked that 
“the German legal framework did not preclude RegTP from authorising 
proposed charges which are contrary to Article [102 TFEU].”314 In conclusion, 
the regulatory authorisations cannot in any way change the finding of abuse. 
 
While the first three reasons may appear counterintuitive, they at least rest on a 
solid legal basis. The last consideration raises questions.315 It may be correct that 
the German regulatory framework did not preclude RegTP from authorising 
charges that were contrary to Art. 102 TFEU. But the case law determines the 
following: 
 
“[T]he Treaty nevertheless strictly prohibits [national regulatory authorities] from giving 
encouragement, in any form whatsoever, to the adoption of agreements or concerted practices 
with regard to tariffs contrary to Article [101(1)] or Article [102], as the case may be.”316 
 
In that sense, the CFI stated that “RegTP is obliged, like all organs of the State, 
to respect the provisions of the [Treaties]”.317 It then reasoned that RegTP was 
a telecom regulator, not a competition authority, and that its objectives differed 
from those of competition policy.318 That may well be true, but RegTP was still 
not allowed to approve tariffs that were contrary to Art. 102 TFEU, and its 
                                                 
310 CFI 10 April 2008, case T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, Deutsche Telekom, ECR 2008, II-477, 
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decisions to do so should have resulted in action against Germany under Art. 
258 TFEU.319 
 
8.4.2. Telefónica 
 
103. FACTS – During the infringement period in Telefónica320 (September 
2001-December 2006)321 55 conflicts in relation to access to the local network 
were brought before the CMT (the Spanish telecom regulator), most of which 
resulted in a decision against Telefónica. 322  In 2007, however, the Spanish 
National Competition Commission denied a similar claim.323 CMT also worked 
with ex ante decisions designed to ensure that there was no margin squeeze, which 
Telefónica abided by.324 
 
104. COURT’S ASSESSMENT – The General Court dismissed these decisions 
as irrelevant in similar fashion to the Deutsche Telekom case.325 Firstly, CMT is not 
a competition but a regulatory authority, and it has never intervened to enforce 
Art. 102 TFEU.326 Even if it did, the Commission cannot be bound by decisions 
taken by national authorities.327 On top of that, CMT lacked certain information 
it needed to examine a margin squeeze.328 Lastly, the cost model used by CMT 
in its ex ante decisions was not appropriate for the purposes of applying Art. 102 
TFEU.329 
 
105. INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS – As in Deutsche Telekom, the argument 
was raised that the Commission ought to have brought an action for failure to 
fulfil obligations against Spain under Art. 258 TFEU. According to Telefónica, 
the CMT failed to ensure the absence of a margin squeeze and, therefore, did 
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not comply with the 2002 regulatory framework. 330  The General Court 
responded that the Commission had made no such finding, and even if it did, 
that would no effect on the lawfulness of the contested decision.331  
 
8.4.3. Underlying theory, alternative, conclusion 
 
106. INTRODUCTION – The picture that emerges is the following: national 
regulatory authorities and courts are strictly prohibited from encouraging 
competition law abuses, but even far-reaching encouragements do not absolve 
the undertaking in question. Moreover, Member States can rest assured they will 
not face infringement proceedings for this encouragement. Two strong 
principles seem to underlie this position: the special responsibility of dominant 
undertakings and the Commission’s discretion in bringing infringement 
proceedings. 
 
107. 1) SPECIAL RESPONSBILITY – The theory of special responsibility is well 
established in the case law of the European courts. It holds that an undertaking 
in a dominant market position has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct 
to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.332 Such a 
special responsibility is justified because Art. 102 TFEU “refers not only to 
practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also to those which 
are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition 
structure.”333 
 
This special responsibility has been specified in a margin squeeze context. The 
European courts have held that a regulated undertaking is obliged to submit 
applications for adjustment of its charges at a time when those charges have the 
effect of impairing genuine undistorted competition on the common market.334 
So when the national regulator is not implementing the European regulatory 
framework, the undertakings have to take this task upon them. In a way, this 
makes undertakings the national regulator’s fail-safe. But there is inconsistency 
in the fact that these national regulators, through their Member States, do not 
get punished, while the undertakings further down the chain do. Apparently 
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Member States bear no special responsibility. This status of immunity is not 
likely to give regulators incentives to take due account of European competition 
rules.335  
 
108. 2) COMMISSION DISCRETION – In the end, the absence of infringement 
proceedings against Member States comes down to a protected unwillingness of 
the European Commission. The ECJ has repeatedly held the following: 
 
“[U]nder the system established by Article [258 TFEU], the Commission enjoys a 
discretionary power as to whether it will bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations and 
it is not for the Court to judge whether that discretion was wisely exercised.”336 
 
In margin squeeze cases, the European courts have referred to this case law 
whenever the failure to fulfil obligations was brought up by the parties.337 The 
possibility of the Commission to bring infringement proceedings in no way 
affects the lawfulness of its decision, as that decision merely finds the undertaking 
to infringe Art. 102 TFEU, a provision that only concerns economic 
operators.338 In other words, the Commission’s discretion is untouchable. 
 
109. ALTERNATIVE – It must be pointed out that infringement proceedings 
are not an easy solution either. They are often cumbersome and lengthy, and 
when it comes to their ‘national champions’, Member States have shown 
themselves not to go down without a fight.339 But the Commission’s does not 
face a binary choice between infringement proceedings against the Member 
State and action against the regulated undertaking. It could also choose to use 
the power it was given by Art. 106(3) TFEU, namely to “address appropriate 
directives or decisions to Member States” in order to ensure the application of 
the competition rules.340 This is by far the quickest course of action, as the 
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Commission can directly impose such a decision. 341  It could prove to be a 
valuable alternative. 
 
110. CONCLUSION – The problematic interaction between the Commission 
and national regulatory authorities have come up several times now, but never 
with a satisfying conclusion for the undertakings involved. The issue has been 
presented as an ultra vires application of Art. 102 TFEU, as a breach of the 
principles of subsidiarity, legal certainty and proportionality, and as a breach of 
the duty of sincere cooperation (Art. 4(3) TEU). However, the European courts 
seem partly unable and partly unwilling to meaningfully address the difficult 
situation regulated undertakings are in. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
 
The conclusion of this paper refers back to the research questions it started from. 
A concise answer to each of those questions is given. The author will also 
cautiously look to the future. However, as Niels BOHR famously said, “prediction 
is very difficult, especially if it’s about the future.”342 
 
1. How do the European courts assess whether there is a margin 
squeeze abuse?  
 
The early history of margin squeeze was confusing, but over the last decade, the 
Commission adopted a rational margin squeeze theory. Essentially, an 
undertaking may be held liable for margin squeezing when its upstream or 
downstream pricing policy does not allow an equally efficient competitor to 
trade profitably on the downstream market. Apart from relying on the as-
efficient-competitor test, this theory conceives margin squeeze as a stand-alone 
abuse, and requires at least a potential anti-competitive effect. After 
confirmation and elaboration by the European courts, the Commission 
continues to apply this theory in recent decisions. Observing this string of 
consistency, the author expects future margin squeeze cases to be judged by the 
same standards. Change, if any, may occur in the relation between margin 
squeeze and refusal to deal. Maybe the Commission returns to its enforcement 
priority criteria. Maybe an Advocate General delivers another strong opinion, 
this time successfully prompting the ECJ to reassess its position on 
indispensability. But this would require a margin squeeze case to make it all the 
way up to the ECJ, which recent practice shows to be uncommon. In any case, 
the Commission and the European courts are not known for retracing their steps. 
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2. Where does margin squeeze fit in the European legislative 
framework?  
 
a. Theoretically, where could margin squeeze fit in the competition law framework, and how do 
the European courts currently conceive margin squeeze? 
 
Margin squeeze overlaps with a number of other abuses of dominant position. 
Price discrimination, predatory pricing and constructive refusal to deal all 
capture margin squeeze up to some point. But as this overlap is never perfect, 
squeezing margin squeeze under one of those abuses invariably falls short. 
Therefore, courts and authors often conceive margin squeeze as a combination 
of existing abuses. Finding a margin squeeze in the United States requires either 
a duty to deal at the wholesale level or predatory pricing at the retail level. This 
is a rather narrow margin squeeze theory (if it is one at all). Doctrine is most 
drawn to the combination of price discrimination and predatory pricing 
(supplemented by excessive pricing). But these theories are never able to fully 
account for the vertical integration of the dominant undertaking, especially 
when that undertaking does not operate on the downstream market through a 
subsidiary. To entirely capture this, the European courts conceive margin 
squeeze as a stand-alone abuse. Instead of investigating either the upstream price 
or the downstream price, they look at the spread between those prices. The 
author finds it hard to imagine the Commission and the European courts moving 
away from this conception, although, as noted, an approximation with refusal to 
supply is possible. 
 
b. How does the competition law approach interact with the regulatory approach? 
 
When it comes to margin squeeze, the interaction between competition law 
approach and the regulatory approach is problematic. The Commission and the 
European courts have chosen for complementarity between the two regimes, 
with the state compulsion defence serving as an exception. This exception is 
meant to balance liability between undertakings and the state, but, given its 
narrow scope, does not achieve its purpose. Firstly, national regulatory 
authorities and courts are strictly prohibited from encouraging competition law 
abuses, but even far-reaching encouragements do not absolve the undertaking 
in question. Secondly, Member States can rest assured they will not face 
infringement proceedings for this encouragement. This problematic interaction 
has come up several times now, but never with a satisfying conclusion for the 
undertakings involved. It seems like the special responsibility of dominant 
undertakings has been driven too far, but insofar as the European courts are able 
to address this issue, they are unwilling. Thus, change would realistically come 
from the Commission itself. This would mean a rethinking of its enforcement 
strategy, e.g. by putting more trust in national regulators and enhancing 
collaboration. A change of course could benefit both the Commission and the 
undertakings involved. As the previous Commission actions seem partly 
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motivated by the project of liberalisation (of the telecom market), progress in that 
area may cause the Commission to re-evaluate its course. 
 
